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1355 
SHARING ECONOMY INEQUALITY: HOW 
THE ADOPTION OF CLASS ACTION 
WAIVERS IN THE SHARING ECONOMY 
PRESENTS A THREAT TO RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
Abstract: In recent years, the sharing economy has pervaded the life of the con-
sumer, challenging the regulatory and business status quo. Despite the pluralistic 
messages of many sharing economy companies, racial discrimination is a grow-
ing problem on peer-to-peer networks such as Uber and Airbnb. Victims of dis-
crimination, however, have encountered an even greater opponent: class action 
waivers in arbitration agreements, which are omnipresent in sharing economy 
company contracts. Due to the inherent tie between class action and civil rights, 
racial discrimination claims in the sharing economy are held hostage by individ-
ual arbitration agreements. This Note argues that without action by Congress or a 
regulatory agency, such waivers threaten future civil rights enforcement. 
INTRODUCTION 
In March 2015, Gregory Selden, an African-American man, planned a 
weekend trip to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.1 Selden opted to use Airbnb, an 
online marketplace that connects homeowners with travelers seeking accom-
modations, to book his lodging.2 He browsed the listings, found a room listed 
as “available” for his desired dates, and contacted the host.3 The host, Paul, 
responded that despite the information on Airbnb, the room was not vacant on 
Selden’s desired dates.4 Later that afternoon, Selden continued his search for 
travel accommodations on Airbnb and noticed something strange: the room he 
was rejected from earlier was still listed as “available.”5 The odd circumstanc-
es surrounding the room’s availability, combined with the fact that he included 
a picture of his face on his Airbnb profile, led Selden to believe that he may 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 16-cv-00933, 2016 WL 6476934, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2016); Second 
Amended Complaint at 5, Selden v. Airbnb, No. 1:16-cv-00933-CRC (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2016). See gener-
ally Vahuini Vara, How Airbnb Makes It Hard to Sue for Discrimination, NEW YORKER (Nov. 3, 2016), 
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/how-airbnb-makes-it-hard-to-sue-for-discrimination 
[https://perma.cc/A7K6-5UNM] (providing a summary of Gregory Selden’s Airbnb lawsuit). 
 2 Selden, 2016 WL 6476934, at *2; About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/8FUX-QLME]. 
 3 Selden, 2016 WL 6476934, at *2. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
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have been racially discriminated against.6 To test his hypothesis, he created 
two imitation accounts with white sounding names and profile pictures of 
white people.7 Using the imitation accounts, Selden again contacted Paul and 
requested the same room for the same dates—Paul immediately accepted the 
faux requests.8 
Shortly after his discovery, Selden filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia against Airbnb on behalf of himself 
and other African-Americans who had allegedly been discriminated against on 
Airbnb.9 He alleged that Airbnb violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, the Fair Housing Act of 1968, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.10 The district court, 
however, granted Airbnb’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that the court 
lacked jurisdiction over Selden’s substantive claim.11 The judge explained that 
the court could not hear the case because Selden agreed to Airbnb’s terms of 
service when he created his account, which included an individual arbitration 
clause.12 Thus, not only was Selden precluded from a jury trial, but he was also 
barred from pursuing a class action claim.13 
Gregory Selden’s failed attempt to bring forth a class-action claim high-
lights a troubling trend within the sharing economy: individual arbitration 
clauses found in terms of service agreements have made it nearly impossible to 
                                                                                                                           
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. Selden’s first alias account was for a man named “Jesse” and included a profile picture of a 
white person. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 9. The second account stated the user’s 
name was “Todd” and also included a photograph of a white person. Id. at 10. 
 8 Selden, 2016 WL 6476934, at *2. 
 9 Id.; Katie Benner, Airbnb Vows to Fight Racism, but Its Users Can’t Sue to Prompt Fairness, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/20/technology/airbnb-vows-to-fight-
racism-but-its-users-cant-sue-to-prompt-fairness.html [https://perma.cc/599V-XZT2]. 
 10 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012) (mandating that discrimination in contracts is unconstitutional); 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)–(b) (defining public accommodation); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3604 (dictating that discrimination in housing is unconstitutional); Selden, 2016 WL 6476934, at *2. 
First, Selden argued that Airbnb’s actions violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act and the Fair Hous-
ing Act. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 11–12; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a). Selden ex-
plained that Airbnb, as an inn, hotel, motel or other establishment that provides lodging to transient 
guests, is a place of public accommodation. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 11–12; see 
42 U.S.C. § 2000(b) (defining public accommodation). Selden’s second cause of action was that 
Airbnb violated the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, because Airbnb discriminated 
against Selden in its contract with him. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 12–13. Last, 
Selden argued that the Airbnb agent was untruthful when disclosing availability about the housing, 
violating the Fair Housing Act. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 14; see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3604 
 11 Selden, 2016 WL 6476934, at *8. 
 12 Id.; Terms of Service, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/terms [https://perma.cc/8QMS-32G5] 
[hereinafter Airbnb Terms] (stating that all disputes must be resolved through arbitration on an indi-
vidual basis). Further, the district court explained that there was a lack of support for Selden’s argu-
ment that there is an inherent conflict between racial discrimination claims and arbitration. Selden, 
2016 WL 6476934, at *7–8. 
 13 Selden, 2016 WL 6476934, at *8; Airbnb Terms, supra note 12. 
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develop effective racial discrimination claims against powerful companies 
such as Uber, Airbnb, and Lyft.14 The sharing economy purportedly creates 
pluralistic platforms where people can collaborate to buy and sell goods and 
services; however, racial discrimination has prevented minorities from having 
a fair opportunity to engage in this market.15 Lawyers and legal scholars are 
developing theories on how “marketplace” companies such as Airbnb could be 
found liable under existing law and are proposing ways in which regulations 
could be reformed.16 While such theories are maturing, these efforts may never 
be addressed by a court due to the widespread adoption of mandatory arbitra-
tion clauses in the sharing economy.17 
Mandatory arbitration clauses, which are often coupled with a class action 
waiver, present a unique and troubling challenge to racial discrimination due to 
clashing legal standards.18 An arbitration clause with a class action waiver re-
                                                                                                                           
 14 See Selden, 2016 WL 6476934, at *6–8 (holding that the plaintiff must arbitrate his discrimina-
tion claim); Allison Frankel, Uber and the Gig Economy’s Existential Litigation Threat, REUTERS 
(Apr. 16, 2016), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2016/04/06/uber-and-the-gig-economys-
existential-litigation-threat/ [https://perma.cc/VZN7-FDN8] (stating that the widespread use of indi-
vidual arbitration clauses in the sharing economy creates a serious threat to civil litigation).  
 15 See Benjamin Edelman et al., Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from a 
Field Experiment, AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON., Apr. 2017, at 2 (reporting findings of racial discrim-
ination on Airbnb); Yanbo Ge et al., Racial and Gender Discrimination in Transportation Network 
Companies 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 22776, 2016) (summarizing findings of 
racial discrimination in Boston and Seattle on Uber); Nancy Leong, New Economy, Old Biases, 100 
MINN. L. REV. 2153, 2160–63 (2016) (discussing how discrimination has emerged in the sharing 
economy); Max Nesterak et al., #AirbnbWhileBlack: How Hidden Bias Shapes the Sharing Economy, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 26, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/04/26/475623339/-airbnbwhileblack-
how-hidden-bias-shapes-the-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/5LQM-5Y9J] (sharing anecdotes of 
African-Americans who have been discriminated against while using Airbnb); Vara, supra note 1; 
Gillian White, Uber and Lyft Are Failing Black Riders, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.
theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/uber-lyft-and-the-false-promise-of-fair-rides/506000/ 
[https://perma.cc/YS3Y-VBSP] (“Uber, Lyft and other ride-sharing services were supposed to be a 
more egalitarian transportation option than a traditional cab service . . . . But a new study finds that 
some of the problems persist.”). 
 16 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 10–14 (alleging that Airbnb violated Title II, 
the Fair Housing Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Aaron Belzer & Nancy Leong, The New Public Accom-
modation, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271, 1302–04 (2017) (discussing Airbnb’s status as a public accommoda-
tion under the Fair Housing Act); see infra note 177 (detailing the different theories proposed by legal 
scholars). 
 17 See Benner, supra note 9 (stating that class action waivers hinder racial discrimination claims); 
see also Belzer & Leong, supra note 16, at 1302–06 (discussing the emerging arguments that sharing 
economy companies could be held liable under existing law); infra note 177 (detailing novel theories 
regarding Airbnb and civil rights laws). 
 18 See Lauren Guth Barnes, How Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class Action Waivers 
Undermine Consumer Rights and Why We Need Congress to Act, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 333–
34 (2015) (discussing the values of class action and how arbitration frustrates the class action goals); 
Joanne Doroshow, Fact Sheet: Class Actions Are Critical to Remedy Workplace Racial Discrimina-
tion, AM. ASS’N FOR JUST.: FIGHTING FOR JUST. BLOG (Oct. 22, 2014), https://www.justice.org/blog/
fact-sheet-class-actions-are-critical-remedy-workplace-racial-discrimination [https://perma.cc/UUK8-
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quires that a plaintiff assert his or her claims individually.19 Racial discrimina-
tion cases, however, often require the resources and systemic relief that ac-
company a class action lawsuit.20 Thus, attempts to unearth systemic, racial 
discrimination issues in the sharing economy are held hostage at the hands of 
arbitration agreements that include class action waivers.21 As the sharing econ-
omy becomes increasingly pervasive in the lives of consumers, cases like 
Gregory Selden’s will only become more common.22 
This Note examines Airbnb as a case study to explore the setbacks created 
by the omnipresence of individual arbitration clauses within the sharing econo-
my.23 Part I of this Note discusses the emergence of the sharing economy, and 
discrimination in the sharing economy sphere.24 Part II provides a background of 
arbitration law and class action waivers, and explores why such clauses are pop-
ular in the sharing economy.25 Part III of this Note shifts to civil rights law and 
explains the strong tie between civil rights and class action claims.26 Further, it 
argues that the waivers in arbitration agreements pose a threat to minorities.27 
Part IV of this Note argues despite the courts’ unwillingness to limit class action 
waivers, Congress should pass legislation with a contrary congressional com-
mand to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), or a federal agency should promul-
gate regulations banning class action waivers in the civil rights realm.28 
                                                                                                                           
K2K5] (highlighting the importance of class action in racial discrimination cases); see infra notes 96–
113 and accompanying text (discussing why arbitration and class action waivers are utilized together).  
 19 See Selden, 2016 WL 6476934, at *8 (requiring that plaintiff Gregory Selden arbitrate his racial 
discrimination claims); Barnes, supra note 18, at 336 (explaining that most arbitration clauses include 
class action waivers); Airbnb Terms, supra note 12 (“[Y]ou and Airbnb are each waiving the right to a 
trial by jury or to participate as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class action lawsuit, class-
wide arbitration.”). 
 20 See infra notes 132–151 and accompanying text (discussing the inherent tie between class 
action and racial discrimination claims). 
 21 See Selden, 2016 WL 6476934, at *8 (granting Airbnb’s motion to individually arbitrate the 
racial discrimination claim); Benner, supra note 9; Vara, supra note 1. 
 22 See Selden, 2016 WL 6476934, at *4–5 (discussing how online adhesion contracts with arbitra-
tion clauses are generally enforceable); Stephen Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing 
Economy, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 147, 160 (2016) (stating that the sharing economy is here to stay); 
Niam Yaraghi & Shamika Ravi, The Current and Future State of the Sharing Economy, BROOKINGS 
INST. (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-current-and-future-state-of-the-
sharing-economy/ [https://perma.cc/H3L9-UWKA] (finding that the sharing economy is growing). 
 23 See infra notes 29–245 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 29–63 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 64–121 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 122–220 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 122–220 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 221–246 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE RISE OF THE SHARING ECONOMY  
In the past five years, companies such as Uber, Airbnb, and Lyft have 
changed the way people approach traveling, lodging, and shopping.29 These 
sharing economy companies promote collaborative consumerism and chal-
lenge the traditional roles of hotels, taxis, and other rental services.30 While 
such platforms have been extremely successful, generating billions of dollars 
in revenue, they have simultaneously dodged a large amount of legal liabil-
ity—especially civil rights violations—due to the widespread adoption of indi-
vidual arbitration clauses.31 
This Part sets the landscape of this increasingly problematic issue.32 Sec-
tion A discusses the rise of the sharing economy, the roots of Airbnb, and the 
rise of discrimination within this setting.33 Section B discusses the nascent dis-
crimination within this setting.34  
                                                                                                                           
 29 See Miller, supra note 22, at 156–60 (discussing that the sharing economy is popular because 
consumers are interested in the products offered by such companies, and it allows consumers to gain 
value from under-utilized goods “such as the extra bedroom in a house”); Yaraghi & Ravi, supra note 
22; Aaron Smith, Shared, Collaborative, and on Demand: The New Digital Economy, PEW RES. CTR. 
(May 19, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/05/19/the-new-digital-economy/ [https://perma.cc/
UE7S-WGY3] (explaining that the sharing economy touches many aspects of people’s lives). In a 
recent study, the Pew Research Center found that 15% of Americans have used a ride hailing applica-
tion and 11% of Americans have used a home sharing platform. Smith, supra. Further, the use of such 
applications is heavily concentrated among young people; 18–29 year olds are seven times as likely to 
use ride hauling apps than those over the age of 65. Id. 
 30 See Miller, supra note 22, at 151, 166–68 (discussing how certain sharing economy companies 
challenge traditional zoning laws and other regulations); Yaraghi & Ravi, supra note 22, (discussing 
how the sharing economy presents a regulatory challenge). For example, the sharing economy chal-
lenges zoning laws and the notion of the “single use residential zone.” Miller, supra note 22, at 166–
67. 
 31 See Martha Nimmer, The High Cost of Mandatory Arbitration, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RE-
SOL. 183, 202 (2011) (noting that arbitration decreases the fear of civil rights litigation); Lorelei Lard, 
Sharing Isn’t Caring When Small Businesses Skirt Civil Rights Laws, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (May 1, 
2017), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/sharing_services_civil_rights_lawsuits 
[https://perma.cc/PP6S-YQKE] (noting that arbitration clauses have prevented the issue of racial dis-
crimination in the sharing economy from being tested in court); David Sirota & Christopher Zara, 
Airbnb, Forced Arbitration, and an Evolving Privacy Policy That Shares More Than Homes, INT’L 
BUS. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2016, 7:48 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/airbnb-forced-arbitration-evolving-
privacy-policy-shares-more-homes-2348752 [https://perma.cc/4KGY-STBH] (highlighting forced 
arbitration in Uber and Airbnb); Rolfe Winkler & Douglas MacMillan, The Secret Math of Airbnb’s 
$24 Billion Valuation, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 17, 2015, 3:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-secret-
math-of-airbnbs-24-billion-valuation-1434568517 [https://perma.cc/Q5BV-K5N3] (stating that 
Airbnb was projected to triple their revenue in three years); The Sharing Economy, PRICEWATER-
HOUSECOOPERS 14 https://www.pwc.com/us/en/technology/publications/assets/pwc-consumer-
intelligence-series-the-sharing-economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB22-6UYR (claiming that Uber was 
valued at $41.2 billion as of February 2015 and that projections show that five sharing economy sec-
tors could generate over $335 billion by the year 2025). 
 32 See infra notes 35–63 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 35–50 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 51–63 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Rise of the Sharing Economy and Airbnb in Particular 
Twenty-first century technological developments have created a society 
connected in ways once unimaginable.35 In addition to diminishing spatial 
borders, these developments have facilitated the widespread dissemination of 
information, creating a new sphere of consumerism.36 This development is 
two-fold: first, it creates a platform where people can offer their goods and 
services, and second, it provides the means for consumers to find people in 
their communities offering such goods and services.37 This phenomenon cre-
ates a network of peers and has been coined the “sharing economy.”38 
While the idea of the sharing economy appears to be a simple concept, 
this hybrid market is supported by a number of massive technology companies 
that have made billions in revenue by creating the platforms where peer-to-
peer sharing takes place.39 The sharing economy has been most successful in 
the transportation and lodging sector, where companies such as Uber and 
Airbnb dominate the market.40 Peer-to-peer sharing, however, is not limited to 
travel and lodging; sharing economies are formed almost daily in a variety of 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Russell Belk, You Are What You Access: Sharing and Consumption Online, 67 J. BUS. & 
RES. 1595, 1596 (2014) (explaining that the internet has created new ways of sharing goods); Joseph 
Shuford, Note, Hotel, Motel, Holiday Inn and Peer-to-Peer Rentals, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 
301, 309–10 (2015) (highlighting how technology has shaped the lives of consumers). 
 36 See Belk, supra note 35, at 1596 (defining the new sphere of collaborative consumerism); 
Shuford, supra note 35, at 309–10 (explaining how technological developments have facilitated the 
buying and selling of goods); Peter Nichol, How the Sharing Economy Is Shaping the Future Work in 
Healthcare, CIO MAG., Jun. 29, 2016 (highlighting the numerous industries where the sharing econ-
omy has a presence). 
 37 See Belk, supra note 35, at 1596 (explaining how technology has created collaborative con-
sumerism, where people coordinate buying and selling goods); Shuford, supra note 35,at 309 (ex-
plaining how technological developments have facilitated the buying and selling of goods). 
 38 See Shuford, supra note 35, at 305–06 (discussing the background of the sharing economy); 
Yaraghi & Ravi, supra note 22 (defining the sharing economy). 
 39 See Miller, supra note 22, at 160–61 (discussing the clout of Airbnb in the hotel industry); 
Shuford, supra note 35, at 309. As of December 2015, Uber was valued at almost $70 billion, surpas-
sing the riches of Ford and General Motors. Liyan Chen, At $68 Billion Valuation, Uber Will Be Big-
ger Than GM, Ford, and Honda, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2015, 11:23 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
liyanchen/2015/12/04/at-68-billion-valuation-uber-will-be-bigger-than-gm-ford-and-honda/#20865e
7232e3 [https://perma.cc/4CJU-6NLE]. Airbnb is current valued at over $30 billion. David Morris, 
Airbnb Valued at $30 Billion in $850 Million Capital Raise, FORTUNE (Aug. 6, 2016), http://fortune.
com/2016/08/06/airbnb-valued-at-30-billion/ [https://perma.cc/W4QT-D3YX]. 
 40 See Miller, supra note 22, at 160–61 (discussing the clout of Airbnb in the hotel industry); 
Room for More: Business Travelers Embrace the Sharing Economy, CERTIFY, https://www.certify.
com/Infograph-Sharing-Economy-Q2-2015.aspx [https://perma.cc/SH2R-EA5P]. One study found 
that 79% of rides in San Francisco, 60% of rides in Dallas, and 54% of rides in Los Angeles are 
through Uber. Room for More: Business Travelers Embrace the Sharing Economy, supra. The sharing 
economy is also prominent in sectors such as learning, municipal, goods, health and wellness, space, 
food, logistics and corporate. Miller, supra, at 149, 151. 
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different sectors.41 One study projected that by the year 2025, the sharing 
economy could generate over $335 billion in revenue.42 As the sharing econo-
my continues to grow in a number of industries, it is likely to become more 
pervasive in the lives of consumers.43 
Airbnb, an online marketplace where homeowners rent their residences to 
customers seeking short-term accommodation, is one of the sharing economy’s 
biggest successes.44 The company was founded in 2008 by three entrepreneurs, 
Brian Chesky, Nathan Blecharczyk, and Joe Gebbie, each now with an esti-
mated net worth over $3 billion.45 What started as a marketplace where people 
could “crash” on a local’s air mattress evolved into a mission to make custom-
ers feel at home while traveling anywhere in the world.46 Specifically, the 
founders’ hopes are to enhance travelers’ experiences by adding the personal 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See Brian J. Miller, Telemedicine and the Sharing Economy: The “Uber” for Healthcare, 22 
AM. J. MANAGED CARE, e420, e421 (2016); Miller, supra note 22, at 151 (finding that sharing econ-
omy companies emerge almost daily in numerous market sectors); Nichol, supra note 36 (discussing 
the emerging sharing economy sectors). For example, Teledoc is a sharing economy company that 
provides on demand medical care through telephone and videoconferencing. About Our Company, 
TELEDOC, https://www.teladoc.com/about-our-company/ [https://perma.cc/2XQU-JKQC]. 
 42 The Sharing Economy, supra note 31, at 14. The $335 billion revenue accounts for the top five 
sharing economy industries: travel, car sharing, finance, staffing, and music and video streaming. Id. 
 43 See Miller, supra note 22, at 151 (discussing the growth of the sharing economy); Nichol, su-
pra note 36 (discussing the emerging sharing economy sectors); The Sharing Economy, supra note 31, 
at 14 (claiming the revenue of the sharing economy will be $335 billion by 2025). 
 44 About Us, supra note 2; Company Overview of Airbnb, Inc., BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.
com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=115705393 [https://perma.cc/N9PD-WPPG]. 
The specific process of how one uses Airbnb differs for travelers and hosts. Earn Money as an Airbnb 
Host, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/host/homes [https://perma.cc/Z2BR-BD9E]; How Do I Create 
an Account?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/221/how-do-i-create-an-account 
[https://perma.cc/R5H6-RNJ3. If one seeks to become a host, the website offers user-friendly direc-
tions on how to list your house or apartment. Earn Money as an Airbnb Host, supra. This includes 
inputting personal information as well as details and photos of the listing. Id. If one is looking to trav-
el, she must first create a profile with relevant personal information and an optional photo. How Do I 
Create an Account?, supra. Once a profile has been created, the traveler need only input the dates and 
city of travel and the number of travelers, which will lead to a list of available accommodations. 
AIRBNB, https://airbnb.com [https://perma.cc/GF6D-3GYJ]. If the traveler sees a room or house that 
he or she likes, there is an option to “contact the host.” Id. From that point forward, the host has the 
ability to either accept or reject the listing. Id. But see What Is Instant Book?, AIRBNB, https://
www.airbnb.com/help/article/523/what-is-instant-book [https://perma.cc/3TCJ-TW9A] (explaining 
the instant book feature, where guests can book a listing without prior approval from a host). 
 45 See Bloomberg Billionaires Index, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/billionaires/
profiles/brian-chesky/ [https://perma.cc/C7Q7-W9FF]; Company Overview of Airbnb, Inc., supra note 
44. 
 46 See Brian Chesky, Belong Together, AIRBNB BLOG (July 16, 2014), http://blog.airbnb.com/
belong-anywhere/ [https://perma.cc/ZMG4-S7S6] (giving an in depth explanation of Airbnb’s current 
mission of belonging); Derek Thompson, Airbnb CEO Brian Chesky on Building a Company and 
Starting a ‘Sharing’ Revolution, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 13, 2013) https://www.theatlantic.com/
business/archive/2013/08/airbnb-ceo-brian-chesky-on-building-a-company-and-starting-a-sharing-
revolution/278635/ [https://perma.cc/M59Z-H2JL] (stating that Airbnb began as a company that sup-
plied air beds on San Francisco floors). 
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touch of connecting the guest and host.47 They explained that it is their mission 
to foster a feeling of universal humanity and a “desire to feel welcomed, re-
spected, and appreciated for who you are, no matter where you might be.”48 
Since Airbnb’s humble beginnings in San Francisco, the company now offers 
spaces in over 34,000 cities in 191 countries.49 Over the past eight years, 
Airbnb has accommodated more than one hundred million guests and is cur-
rently valued at around twenty five billion dollars, surpassing some of the larg-
est hotel chains in the world.50 
B. Discrimination in the Sharing Economy 
Despite many sharing economy companies’ high hopes for global inclu-
sivity, this has not been the reality for their everyday consumers.51 In particu-
lar, Airbnb has been the subject of numerous racial discrimination com-
plaints.52 Specifically, minority travelers have found it more difficult to secure 
open accommodation than their non-minority counterparts.53 For example, 
Quirtina Crittenden, an African-American woman, explained that there were a 
number of times when hosts would not accept her request, claiming that some-
one had just booked the room, or “regulars” were coming into town that week-
end and were staying in the requested room.54 Suspecting discrimination, she 
changed her profile photo from herself to a cityscape—suddenly she no longer 
received such excuses from hosts.55 Quirtina is not alone in her Airbnb trou-
bles.56 When she went public with her frustrations, a number of other minority 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Chesky, supra note 46. 
 48 Id. 
 49 About Us, supra note 2. 
 50AIRBNB LAW ENFORCEMENT TRANSPARENCY REPORT, AIRBNB (Sept. 1, 2016), http://
transparency.airbnb.com/ [https://perma.cc/2SBY-7ZJD]; Johanna Interian, Up in the Air: Harmoniz-
ing the Sharing Economy Through Airbnb Regulations, 39 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 129, 133–34 
(2016). Airbnb’s valuation of $25 billion surpasses Wyndham Worldwide Corporation’s $9.4 billion 
valuation and Hyatt Hotels Corporation’s $9.2 billion valuation. Interian, supra at 133–34. 
 51 See Leong, supra note 15, at 2160–65 (examining racial discrimination by Uber, Airbnb, and 
Lyft); Michael Todisco, Note, Share and Share Alike? Considering Racial Discrimination in the Nas-
cent Room-Sharing Economy, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 121, 126–27 (2015), https://www.stanford
lawreview.org/online/share-and-share-alike/ [https://perma.cc/2UJ4-FFBF] (discussing racial discrim-
ination in the sharing economy); Elaine Glusac, As Airbnb Grows, So Do Claims of Discrimination, 
N.Y. TIMES, (Jun. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/travel/airbnb-discrimination-
lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/Z8PG-52FR] (highlighting a growing number of racial discrimination 
claims on Airbnb); Nesterak, supra note 15 (conveying the experience of a young black women who 
was discriminated a number of times while using Airbnb’s services). 
 52 Glusac, supra note 51; Nesterak, supra note 15. 
 53 Edelman, supra note 15, at 10–11; Nesterak, supra note 15. 
 54 Nesterak, supra note 15. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See Rahel Gebreyes, #AirbnbWhileBlack Highlights Discrimination Faced by Travelers, HUFF-
INGTON. POST (May 5, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/airbnbwhileblack-discrimination-
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Airbnb users shared their similar experiences.57 A group at Harvard Business 
School (“HBS”) quantified these experiences and after an intensive study, 
found that African-American travelers were 16% less likely to be accepted as 
an Airbnb guest than those travelers with distinctly white names.58 Thus, the 
experiences shared on social media as well as the HBS study provide evidence 
that racial discrimination within the Airbnb community is undoubtedly real.59 
Studies have found racial discrimination on the Uber platform as well.60 
One report found that in Seattle, African-Americans have up to a 35% increase 
in waiting time in comparison to whites.61 Further, the study concluded that in 
Boston, males with African-American sounding names were more than twice 
as likely to have their ride cancelled than males with white sounding names.62 
Thus, despite novel technologies and progressive messages, companies in the 
sharing economy still struggle to combat racial discrimination on their plat-
forms.63 
II. ARBITRATION IN THE SHARING ECONOMY 
Airbnb’s novel home sharing structure challenges the traditional regulato-
ry scheme, especially in the realm of civil rights law.64 As a result, there has 
been growing legal scholarship concerning how Airbnb and other sharing 
                                                                                                                           
faced-by-black-travelers_us_572a66d6e4b016f37894a5c4 [https://perma.cc/W4AQ-5VXV] (citing 
anecdotes of racial discrimination on Airbnb); Nesterak, supra note 15. 
 57 See Gebreyes, supra note 56; Nesterak, supra note 15. 
 58 Edelman, supra note 15, at 2. In their study, the researchers sent 6400 messages between July 
7, 2015 and July 30, 2015. Id. at 9–10. Some messages were sent from profiles with distinctive white 
names, whereas other messages were sent from profiles with distinctively African-American names. 
Id. at 9. The study found that those with distinctively African-American names were accepted 42% of 
the time, while those with distinctively white sounding names were accepted 50% of the time. Id. at 
10–11. 
 59 See id. (finding that people with white sounding names are more likely to be accepted on 
Airbnb); Nesterak, supra note 15 (discussing anecdotes of racial discrimination on Airbnb); Vara, 
supra note 1 (discussing the discrimination Gregory Selden faced on Airbnb). 
 60 See Ge, supra, note 15, at 2 (discussing racial discrimination on Uber); see also Edelman, su-
pra note 15, at 2 (finding racial discrimination on Airbnb). 
 61 Ge, supra note 15, at 2. 
 62 Id. at 16. Specifically, the study concluded that males with African-American sounding names 
are cancelled on 11.2% of the time, while white males are cancelled on 4.5% of the time. See id. at 2. 
 63 See Leong, supra note 15, at 2061–63 (discussing how racial discrimination occurs on sharing 
economy platforms); Ge, supra, note 15, at 2 (finding racial discrimination on Uber); Edelman, supra 
note 15, at 2 (finding racial discrimination on Airbnb); see also Chesky, supra note 46 (discussing 
Airbnb’s mantra of belonging anywhere). 
 64 See Belzer & Leong, supra note 16, at 1302–06 (stating that current laws may not be sufficient 
to address racial discrimination in the sharing economy); Hamish McRae, Facebook, Airbnb, Uber, 
and the Unstoppable Rise of the Content Non-Generators, INDEPENDENT (May 5, 2015, 1:11 PM), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/comment/hamish-mcrae/facebook-airbnb-uber-and-the-
unstoppable-rise-of-the-content-non-generators-10227207.html [https://perma.cc/BE7Y-DZNF] (“The 
world’s largest taxi firm, Uber, owns no cars. . . . [a]nd the world’s largest accommodation provider, 
Airbnb, owns no property.”). 
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economy businesses can be held accountable for racial discrimination.65 Any 
efforts to create sharing economy liability for civil rights, however, are serious-
ly undermined by class action waivers due to the strong tie between civil rights 
claims and class action cases.66  
Before delving into class action waivers and racial discrimination, it is im-
portant to understand arbitration’s legal foundation and broader consequences.67 
The omnipresence of arbitration clauses within the sharing economy has numer-
ous implications for employees, independent contractors, and consumers.68 Sec-
tion A of this Part discusses the history of arbitration law.69 Section B discusses 
the implications of class action.70 Section C explains the rise of class action 
waivers.71 Section D discusses the prominence of class action waivers in the 
sharing economy due to the contractual relationship between the user and com-
pany.72 
A. The Dominance of Arbitration 
Although codified nearly a century ago, arbitration remains a controversial 
topic with implications for all parties bound by the agreements.73 In 1925, Con-
                                                                                                                           
 65 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 5 (alleging that Airbnb violated Title II of 
the Civil Rights Act, the Fair Housing Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Naomi Schoenbaum, Gender and 
the Sharing Economy, (Geo. Wash. L. School Pub. L. Res. Paper No. 53, 2016) (explaining that per-
sonalization of services creates a risk of discrimination due to the focus on the seller or buyer’s identi-
ty); Belzer & Leong, supra note 16, at 1302–04 (discussing ways in which sharing economy compa-
nies can be found liable under existing law); see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)–
(e) (2012) (dictating civil rights statutes in federal law). 
 66 See Selden v. Airbnb, No. 1:16-cv-00933-CRC, 2016 WL 6476934, at *8 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 
2016) (demonstrating how a racial discrimination case was sent to individual arbitration due to a class 
action waiver); Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Respondents at 2–3, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (No. 09-893) (ex-
plaining that class actions are able to effectively address civil rights claims, whereas individual claims 
are limited in potency) [hereinafter Brief for NAACP]; Benner, supra note 9 (discussing how class 
action waivers affects racial discrimination claims). 
 67 See infra notes 73–121 and accompanying text. 
 68 See infra notes 73–121 and accompanying text. 
 69 See infra notes 73–83 and accompanying text. 
 70 See infra notes 84–94 and accompanying text. 
 71 See infra notes 96–112 and accompanying text. 
 72 See infra notes 113–121 and accompanying text. 
 73 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012); Barnes, supra note 18 at 336 (discussing how consumers file less 
claims and recover less when bound by an arbitration agreement with a company); Miles Farmer, Note, 
Mandatory and Fair? A Better System of Mandatory Arbitration, 121 YALE L.J. 2346, 2352–60 (2012) 
(highlighting that arbitration is beneficial for its speed and accessibility, but can be harmful when parties 
have unequal bargaining power); Caitlin Toto, Comment, Third Circuit Confirms the Class Arbitration 
“Clear and Unmistakable Standard,” in Chesapeake L.L.C v. Scout Petroleum L.L.C., Dealing Blow to 
Consumers and Employees, 58 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 163, 166 (2017), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.
edu/bclr/vol58/iss6/13 (stating that arbitration is longstanding but controversial); Jessica Silver-
Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-
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gress passed the FAA, a statute that allows parties to resolve legal disputes 
through arbitration by placing the arbitration agreements on the same footing as 
other contracts.74 By adding an arbitration clause in a contract, parties are able to 
sidestep the judicial system and independently resolve disputes.75 While arbitra-
tion is lauded as a faster way to resolve legal disputes, critics highlight due pro-
cess defects that accompany the system.76 Specifically, arbitration limits appel-
late review and precludes a jury trial, two vital judicial mechanisms that bolster 
legitimacy and the parties’ legal rights.77 Further, arbitrators are not bound by 
precedent and are therefore able to craft a solution they believe to be most equi-
                                                                                                                           
deck-of-justice.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/B3EL-HEZ8] (detailing how many consumers and employ-
ees find themselves unable to redress claims against companies because they are precluded from class 
arbitration). Compare Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339 (interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) 
broadly), with id. at 359 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (outlining/describing/explaining a narrow interpretation 
of the FAA). 
 74 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (stating that arbitration agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and enforcea-
ble save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”); Concep-
cion, 563 U.S. at 336 (reciting 9 U.S.C. § 2). 
 75 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (stating that arbitration agreements are equal to contracts); Steelworkers v. 
Am. Mfg. Co. 363 U.S. 564, 567–68 (1959) (explaining the limited function of the courts when par-
ties have agreed to arbitrate). Once parties have entered into a contract containing an arbitration 
clause, the courts can only determine questions of arbitrability. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83–84 (1982) (discussing the distinction between questions of arbitrability and 
questions of procedure). Questions of arbitrability include questions of the agreement’s scope, wheth-
er the arbitration agreement violates law or equity, or where a party asserts a federal statutory claim 
and Congress has demonstrated a clear intent that the statutory claim not be arbitrated. Id. All other 
matters, such as questions of procedure, are to be decided by the arbitrator. Id. at 84; see Martin Saun-
ders, Class Arbitration—Who Decides? NAT’L L. REV. (Sep. 2, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/
article/class-arbitration-who-decides [https://perma.cc/7RRM-39X3] (discussing the dispute of “who 
decides” in class action availability). 
 76 See U.S CONST. amend. V; Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the Scope of Judicial Re-
view of Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 147, 148 (1997) (explaining the generally accepted 
arbitration rule that there shall be no review of alleged errors of fact or law); Jean Sternlight, Rethink-
ing the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 72 TUL. L. REV. 
1, 81 (1997) (stating that binding arbitration raises due process concerns) [hereinafter Sternlight, Su-
preme Court’s Preferences]; Farmer, supra note 73, at 2355–60 (discussing the drawbacks of manda-
tory arbitration). Arbitration is lauded as a faster dispute resolution system because the discovery 
process is limited, rights of appeal are limited, and the decisions do not require a detailed finding of 
fact. Dwight Golann, Developments in Consumer Financial Services Litigation, 43 BUS. LAW. 1081, 
1091 (1988). 
 77 See Smit, supra note 76, at 148 (stating that arbitral awards are rarely reviewed); Jean Stern-
light, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F.L. 
REV. 17, 20–21 (2003) (stating that arbitration precludes a jury trial) [hereinafter Sternlight, The Rise 
and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration]; Farmer, supra note 73, at 2358–60 (noting that there is little 
appellate review in arbitration, which may be favorable to the drafting party). 
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table.78 Thus, while the process is streamlined, it also eliminates many safe-
guards provided for by the judicial system.79 
These impediments are further aggravated by the “repeat player effect.”80 
Many scholars argue that parties frequently appearing before arbitrate panels, 
such as large corporations, fare better than their opponents, who are often indi-
vidual consumers and employees.81 One popular explanation for this phenome-
non is that arbitrators are implicitly biased towards the party that hired them, 
because it is more likely that the party will hire the arbitrator for future proceed-
ings.82 Despite the risks delineated above, companies continue to implement ar-
bitration agreements in their contracts.83  
B. Class Action and Arbitration  
Arbitration’s tension with certain judicial policies is especially evident with 
regards to class action, a federal procedure that allows large numbers of plain-
tiffs to join similar claims.84 While class action dates back to early English law, it 
was not until the 1960s that the process took hold in the American legal sys-
                                                                                                                           
 78 See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individual Critique, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 69, 95–
96 (2007) (discussing how arbitrators have more flexibility than the courts when coming to a deci-
sion). 
 79 See Barnes, supra note 18, at 329 (stating that binding arbitration is preempting people from 
their day in court); Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 77, at 20–21 
(explaining arbitration precludes a jury trial); Weidemaier, supra note 78, at 95–96 (explaining that 
arbitrators have more flexibility to craft a solution they believe the be equitable). 
 80 See, e.g., Lisa Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y 189, 208, 220 (1997) (finding a repeat player affect); Christopher Drahozal & Samantha 
Zynontz, An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer Arbitrations, 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 843, 857–
58 (2010) (discussing that arbitrators have an incentive to have a bias towards a repeat player); THE 
ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP, PUB. CITIZEN 24–25 (2008) (stating that there is support behind the 
conclusion that arbitrators favor business parties because businesses are often repeat players); Farmer, 
supra note 73, at 2355–58 (citing the existence of data evidencing a repeat player bias). 
 81 See Bingham, supra note 80, at 208, 220 (finding there is a repeat player effect in employment 
arbitrations); Drahozal & Zynontz, supra note 80, at 857–58 (discussing the incentive towards decid-
ing cases in favor of repeat players); THE ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP, supra note 80, at 24–25 (dis-
cussing the repeat player affect). 
 82 Drahozal & Zynontz, supra note 80, at 857–58; THE ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP, supra note 
80, at 24–25. 
 83 See Barnes, supra note 18, at 336 (discussing how arbitration clauses are prevalent in a wide 
range of industries); Mandy Walker, The Arbitration Clause Hidden in Many Consumer Contracts, 
CONSUMER REP. (Sep. 29, 2015), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/shopping/the-arbitration-
clause-hidden-in-many-consumer-contracts [https://perma.cc/AGH4-8ND7] (highlighting that arbitra-
tion contracts are hidden within many popular companies’ consumer contracts). This is likely because 
the risks delineated above affect consumers and employees more than they affect companies. See 
Barnes, supra note 18, at 335–36 (stating that arbitration is harmful for consumers because it strips 
away certain judicial protection). 
 84 See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344 (explaining that “requiring the availability of class-wide arbi-
tration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with 
the FAA”). 
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tem.85 Since the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“FRCP”) made class action available to larger groups of people, the procedure 
has been utilized to narrow the power gap between individuals and large corpo-
rate entities.86 
Rule 23 of the FRCP allows an individual to pursue a claim on behalf of an 
entire class if all members suffered similar harm from the same defendant.87 In 
addition to providing judicial efficiency, class action strengthens the rights of in-
dividuals vis-à-vis corporations.88 It does so by emboldening individuals who are 
unwilling or unable to vindicate their legal rights on an individual basis.89 Be-
cause the harm is spread among a large group of people, an individual may not 
feel the urge to initiate a lawsuit over marginal harm and others may not even 
realize that they were harmed.90 Thus, grouping the claims together enables more 
                                                                                                                           
 85 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832 (1999) (stating that class action dates back to 
early English law); Katie Melnick, Defense of the Class Action Lawsuit: An Examination of the Im-
plicit Advantages and a Response to Common Criticism, 22 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 755, 755–56 
(2008) (explaining the history of class action). 
 86 See Melnick, supra note 85, at 755 (discussing the 1966 amendment to Rule 23); Edward 
Sherman, Complex Litigation: Plagued by Concerns Over Federalism, Jurisdiction & Fairness, 37 
AKRON L. REV. 589, 590–91 (2004) (discussing how class action has been important in bringing insti-
tutional reform). Before the 1966 amendments, class action claims were limited to violations of joint 
rights or specific property rights. Sherman, supra at 590. Two important changes, however, expanded 
this standard. Id. at 591. First, the Rule 23(b)(2) class action was introduced, allowing for declaratory 
or injunctive relief when the “party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally 
applicable to the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). This was especially applicable in the civil rights 
context, and allowed for class action lawsuits against hotels, restaurants and other public accommoda-
tions. See Sherman, supra at 590–91 (explaining that the amendments to Rule 23 were paramount in 
enforcing civil rights). Second, 23(b)(3) class action was enacted, which has been deemed a “catch 
all” provision. FED. R. C. P. 23(b)(3); Sherman, supra at 591. Both amendments have been vital in 
enforcing civil rights as well as enhancing standards in prisons, mental hospitals and welfare depart-
ments. See Sherman, supra at 590–91 (discussing the public policy implications of class action law-
suits). 
 87 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). Specifically, the party must meet the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), which 
states that first, the class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; second, 
there is a question of law or fact common to the class; third, the claims or defenses of the representa-
tive party is typical of the claims of the defendant of the class; and fourth, that the lead plaintiff will 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Id. 
 88 See Barnes, supra note 18, at 338 (noting that consumers gain more financial recovery from 
companies through class actions than through individual arbitrations); Melnick, supra note 85, at 787–
89 (discussing that individuals may not have an incentive to bring claims without class action); Sher-
man, supra note 86 at 590–91. 
 89 See Melnick, supra note 85, at 787–89. But see Wade Lambert, Class Action Suit Is a Target 
for Criticism from All Sides, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 19, 1996, 10:03am) https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB829877425363143500 [https://perma.cc/MSZ9-4N3Y] (discussing negative views of class action, 
such as it being a method that facilitates lawyers bringing frivolous lawsuits and being rewarded with 
a big settling fee). 
 90 See Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 15–16 (stating that the Supreme Court “has repeatedly 
recognized the importance of class actions in providing legal redress for inequities that may be too 
time and resource intensive to realistically challenge through isolated individual claims”); Melnick, 
supra note 85, at 787–89 (discussing incentive gaps regarding class action). 
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people to vindicate their rights against large corporate defendants.91 In addition, 
the process provides incentives for lawyers to wage legal battles.92 One person’s 
thirty-dollar overcharge, for example, would not draw many lawyers’ attentions.93 
On the other hand, it would likely be worth a legal team’s time if the harm, and 
thus the potential recovery, were multiplied over thousands of people.94 
C. Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements 
As discussed, class action allows individuals to aggregate resources and at-
tempt to equalize the playing field, creating a potentially costly liability to com-
panies.95 Thus, businesses are generally fearful of class action and its potential 
financial and reputational ramifications.96 Before the prominence of the class 
action waiver, companies had little choice but to internalize this cost by litigating 
or settling the claims.97 The rise of arbitration, however, has allowed many busi-
nesses to avoid the procedure altogether.98 
While the FRCP explicitly provides that a party can bring a claim through 
class action, there is no equivalent rule in arbitration proceedings.99 Arbitration, 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 15–16 (explaining that individuals may not have a 
financial incentive to bring a case alone); Melnick, supra note 85, at 787–89 (discussing incentive 
gaps regarding class action). 
 92 See Amchen Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Cred-
it Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997) (highlighting how class action is a vital tool in small re-
covery claims); Barnes, supra note 18, at 333 (stating that no lawyer or client would take a case where 
the legal fees are much greater than the potential reward). 
 93 See Amchen Prods. Inc., 521 U.S at 617 (quoting Mace, 109 F.3d at 344) (explaining that law-
yers may not have an incentive to take a case where the claims are small); Barnes, supra note 18, at 
333. 
 94 See Amchen Prods. Inc., 521 U.S at 617 (quoting Mace, 109 F.3d at 344). But see Letter from 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce to Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau 4–6 (Dec. 11, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.
com/alison-frankel/files/2013/12/mayerbrown-chamberletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/P22U-N9SR] (not-
ing that class action has marginal benefits for consumers). 
 95 See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee 
Awards, 7. J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 811–12 (2010) (stating that businesses fear class action). 
 96 Barnes, supra note 18 at 336; Fitzpatrick, supra note 96 at 811–12 (noting that between 2008 
and 2012, over thirty-four million consumers were granted relief from class actions, totaling over $2.7 
billion in rewards). 
 97 See Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 8–9 (discussing recent class action settlements with 
large companies); Barnes, supra note 18 at 338 (noting $2.7 billion paid to consumers between 2008 
and 2012).  
 98 See Barnes, supra note 18 at 329; Jean Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the 
Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 125–26 (2002) (arguing that 
barriers to class action deprive plaintiff’s statutory rights) [hereinafter Sternlight, Will the Class Ac-
tion Survive?]. 
 99 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010) (finding that par-
ties were not compelled to submit to class arbitration because there was nothing within the contract 
mentioning class action). There have been unsuccessful arguments that Rule 81(a)(3), now amended 
as Rule 81(b)(6), allows parties to incorporate Rule 23. See Deiulemar Compagnia di Navigazione 
A.p.A v. M/V Allegra, 198 F.3d 473, 482–83 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding 81(a)(3) does not incorporate 
Rule 23); Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 275–77 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that Rule 
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in contrast, is a creature of contract and any terms of the proceeding must be de-
lineated or referred to in the clause itself.100 Thus, the availability of class action 
is not a guaranteed procedure, but rather depends on the language of the arbitra-
tion clause.101 
 To further aggravate the differences between class action in federal courts 
and arbitration, there is often uneven bargaining power in mandatory arbitration 
contracts.102 Most arbitration agreements are drafted exclusively by the business 
and then presented to the consumer or employee as an adhesion contract.103 
Thus, the consumer or employee has little or no power over the terms of the 
agreement before signing.104  
The combination of companies drafting arbitration agreements with the dis-
taste and fear businesses have of class action has led to the rise of class action 
waivers found in everyday contracts.105A class action waiver is specific language 
within an arbitration clause that precludes parties from joining together to fight 
                                                                                                                           
81(a)(3) does not allow an incorporation of Rule 23). See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23, 81(a)(3) (al-
lowing parties to fill in procedural gaps left open by the FAA). Courts have held that the FAA does 
not leave a procedural gap regarding class action. Champ, 55 F.3d at 275–77. 
 100 See John Townsend, Drafting Arbitration Clauses: Avoiding the 7 Deadly Sins, DISP. RESOL. 
J., Feb.–Apr. 2003, at 3 (highlighting the importance of specifying details within arbitration clauses). 
 101 See Stolt-Nielson, 559 U.S. at 687 (finding that companies cannot be compelled to arbitrate in 
a class when the agreement is silent on the mater); Toto, supra note 73, at 170.  
 102 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY § 3.2 at 4 (2015), http://files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
86TM-AHPH] (finding that less than 7% of people who had pre-dispute clauses in credit card agree-
ments knew that they could not sue the company in court); Barnes, supra note 18 at 336; Katherine 
Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract 
of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1037 (1996) (arguing that employees are rarely in a position 
to negotiate the terms of an arbitration agreement). 
 103 See Barnes, supra note 18, at 336 (discussing the lack of bargaining power consumers have in 
arbitration agreements); Stone, supra note 102, at 1037 (discussing that employees have little to no 
bargaining power). An adhesion contract is a contract that is drafted by one party and presented to the 
other party as take it or leave it. See Barnes, supra note 18, at 329 (defining adhesion contracts). 
 104 See Barnes, supra note 18, at 336 (finding consumers lack bargaining power vis-à-vis corpora-
tions); Stone, supra note 102, at 1037 (explaining that employees are often presented their employ-
ment contracts as take it or leave it). 
 105 See Barnes, supra note 18, at 336 (stating that companies often include class action waivers in 
their mandatory arbitration clauses); Theodore Eisenberg & Gregory Miller, Arbitration’s Summer 
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 884 (2008) (highlighting the omnipresence of class action waivers in con-
sumer arbitration agreements). See generally Joseph Fay et al., Class Action Waivers in Arbitration 
Provisions, in A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO CLASS ACTIONS 575 (Marcy Hogan Greer ed., 2010) 
(providing a general summary of class action waivers in arbitration agreements). One empirical report, 
which studied 100 prominent American companies, found that every consumer contract with an arbi-
tration clause also contained a class action waiver. Eisenberg & Miller supra at 884. But see Brian 
Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Action?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 191–92 (2015) (stating that class action 
waivers are not as prominent as reported). 
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their claims as a collective group.106 Such waivers are usually within lengthy 
contracts and surrounded by complex legal jargon.107 Consequently, many peo-
ple do not realize what rights they have signed away when agreeing to these 
consumer contracts.108 
Attempts to scale back the waivers in arbitration agreements have been un-
successful.109 The Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA very broadly and 
therefore class action waivers found in arbitration agreements are generally en-
forceable.110 Additionally, state attempts to scale back the use of class action 
waivers were struck down in a series of Supreme Court cases holding that the 
FAA preempts state law.111 Thus, class action waivers are generally enforceable, 
despite the uneven bargaining concerns detailed above.112 
                                                                                                                           
 106 See Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 2 (discussing class action bans); Benner, supra note 9 
(defining class action waiver). 
 107 See Airbnb Terms, supra note 12 (demonstrating a class action waiver within a long contract); 
Lyft Terms of Service, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/terms [https://perma.cc/SJR9-3MUN] (same); 
Terms of Service, UBER, https://www.uber.com/legal/terms/us [https://perma.cc/7HZK-ZZ8F] [here-
inafter Uber Terms] (same). 
 108See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 102, § 3.2 at 8 (citing a study where 87% of 
respondents, who had previously been in at least one arbitration agreement, said they had never en-
tered a consumer contract with an arbitration clause); Jeff Sovern et al., Whimsy Little Contracts with 
Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agree-
ments 50 n.173 (St. John’s Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-0009, 2014); Silver-Greenberg & 
Gebeloff, supra note 73 (stating that class action waivers are within employment and consumer con-
tracts). For example, one study found that only 12% of consumers understood they had signed a class 
action waiver, despite the waiver appearing twice and in bold in the contract. Sovern, supra at 50 
n.173. 
 109 See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343–44 (holding that the FAA preempts California’s state law 
deeming class action waivers unconscionable); Jill Gross, Justice Scalia’s Hat Trick and the Supreme 
Court’s Flawed Understanding of Twenty-First Century Arbitration, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 111, 124–25 
(2015) (highlighting three of Justice Scalia’s opinions where he broadly interpreted the FAA, thus 
inhibiting the ability to challenge arbitration agreements). 
 110 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (holding that an 
arbitration clause is enforceable despite the fact the cost of arbitration is higher than the amount an 
individual would recover); Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344 (finding that California common law banning 
class action waivers was preempted by the FAA); Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684 (finding that class 
arbitration cannot be imposed on parties unless there is a contractual basis); Gross, supra note 109, at 
124–25 (highlighting three of Justice Scalia’s opinions where he broadly interpreted the FAA, inhibit-
ing the ability to challenge arbitration agreements). But see Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 
975, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2016) cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017) (No. 16-300) (finding 
that a class action waiver is unenforceable because it violated § 7 of the National Labor Relations 
Act). 
 111 See Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd, P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1428 (2017) (holding that the 
Kentucky Supreme Court’s clear-statement rule, which was used to invalidate an arbitration agree-
ment, is preempted by the FAA); Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352 (holding that the FAA preempts Cali-
fornia’s state law deeming class action waivers in adhesion contracts are unconscionable); Gross, 
supra note 109, at 124–25 (discussing case law upholding binding arbitration and class action waiv-
ers). 
 112 See Kindred Nursing Ctrs Ltd. P’ship, 137 S. Ct. at 1428 (upholding a binding arbitration 
agreement, stating that Kentucky common law is preempted by the FAA); Selden, 2016 WL 6476934, 
at *6–8 (finding that the class action waiver in Airbnb’s arbitration agreement was enforceable be-
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D. Individual Arbitration in the Sharing Economy 
Because arbitration is a creature of contract, class action waivers can only 
exist where there is a contractual relationship between parties.113 The sharing 
economy is primarily based in contract and therefore the waivers are omnipres-
ent in company contracts.114 For example, unlike when one hails a taxicab, call-
ing an Uber car requires that one has already agreed to a user agreement and thus 
an individual arbitration clause.115 As a result, sharing economy companies have 
the opportunity to draft mandatory individual arbitration clauses.116 
Like many sharing economy companies, Airbnb and its users have a con-
tractual relationship.117 That is, one must become an Airbnb “user” and agree to 
terms of service before booking a room.118 The company’s terms of service are 
customary in the sharing economy, stating that any dispute shall be settled in 
binding arbitration.119 The contract posits that all users acknowledge that they 
are waiving their right to consolidate claims in any class action lawsuit.120 Thus, 
                                                                                                                           
cause Selden was notified that he was entering such an agreement with the company through its Terms 
of Services). But see Morris, 834 F.3d at 983–84 (finding class action waivers unenforceable in an 
employment contract because it violated § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act). 
 113 See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 639–40 (2012) (stating that class action waivers require the 
parties to have a contractual relationship); Nimmer, supra note 31 at 202 (stating arbitration is a crea-
ture of contract). 
 114 See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 113, at 639–40 (discussing the limitations of class action 
waivers); Malthe Mikkel Munkoe, Regulating the European Sharing Economy State of Play and 
Challenges, 52 INTERECONOMICS, 38, 43–44 (2017) (highlighting the contractual relationships in the 
sharing economy). 
 115 See Uber Terms, supra note 107 (stating that all disputes must be adjudicated through arbitra-
tion on an individual basis). 
 116 See Airbnb Terms, supra note 12 (mandating that all disputes be submitted through bilateral 
arbitration); Lyft Terms of Service, supra note 107 (same); Uber Terms, supra note 107 (same). 
 117 See Airbnb Terms, supra note 12. To become a user on Airbnb one must sign the user agree-
ment, which contains an arbitration clause. Id. 
 118 See What Are the Requirements to Book on Airbnb?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/
article/1170/what-are-the-requirements-to-book-on-airbnb [https://perma.cc/7BMK-MQ93] (stating 
that anyone who wants to book on Airbnb must share certain information). 
 119 Id. The clause states in relevant part: 
If you reside in the United States, you and Airbnb agree that any dispute, claim or con-
troversy arising out of or relating to these Terms or the breach, termination, enforce-
ment, interpretation or validity thereof, or to the use of the Services or use of the Site, 
Application or Collective Content (collectively, “Disputes”) will be settled by binding 
arbitration, except that each party retains the right to seek injunctive or other equitable 
relief in a court of competent jurisdiction to prevent the actual or threatened infringe-
ment, misappropriation or violation of a party’s copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, 
patents, or other intellectual property rights. 
Id. 
 120 Id. Concerning class action, the clause states in relevant part: 
You acknowledge and agree that you and Airbnb are each waiving the right to a trial by 
jury or to participate as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class action law-
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through its arbitration clause, Airbnb is able to effectively shield itself from the 
courtroom and class action disputes.121 
III. CLASS ACTION WAIVERS PRESENT A SERIOUS THREAT  
TO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
Class action is a vital way in which individuals can bring a fair legal fight 
against a corporation that has done widespread harm.122 While class action 
waivers have widespread effects on consumers and employers generally, the 
waivers distinctly threaten civil rights due to the tie between class action and 
racial discrimination cases.123 Section A of this Part discusses the connection 
between the fight for racial equality and class action.124 Section B of this Part 
explains that class action waivers within the sharing economy endanger the 
future protection of civil rights.125 Section C confronts potential counterargu-
ments that self-regulation and government enforcement are sufficient to en-
force civil rights in the sharing economy.126 
                                                                                                                           
suit, class-wide arbitration, private attorney-general action, or any other representative 
proceeding. Further, unless both you and Airbnb otherwise agree in writing, the arbitra-
tor may not consolidate more than one person’s claims, and may not otherwise preside 
over any form of any class or representative proceeding. If this specific paragraph is 
held unenforceable, then the entirety of this “Dispute Resolution” section will be 
deemed void. Except as provided in the preceding sentence, this “Dispute Resolution” 
section will survive any termination of these Terms. 
Id. 
 121 See Selden, 2016 WL 6476934, at *8 (finding that Selden must take his claim through arbitra-
tion rather than through the court); Airbnb Terms, supra note 12 (presenting an arbitration clause with 
a class action waiver).  
 122 See Barnes, supra note 18, at 340 (explaining that consumers lose a number of rights when 
they unknowingly sign an arbitration clause); Emily Canis, One “Like” Away: Mandatory Arbitration 
for Consumers, 26 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 127, 128–30 (2015) (explaining that many consum-
ers do not know that they are signing arbitration agreements, waiving vital rights away); Sternlight, 
The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 77, at 20–21 (highlighting that consumers 
often sign away their right to a jury trial without knowing). But see Amanda James, Because Arbitra-
tion Can Be Beneficial, It Should Never Have to Be Mandatory, 62 LOY. L. REV. 531, 532–41 (2016) 
(arguing that arbitration is beneficial to the consumer because it is less time consuming and costly 
than litigation). 
 123 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding, as result of a class action, that 
segregation in public schools is unconstitutional); Selden, 2016 WL 6476934, at *8; Brief for 
NAACP, supra note 66, at 2 (stating that class action waivers undermine courts’ ability to enforce 
civil rights); Jack Greenberg, Civil Rights Class Actions: Procedural Means of Obtaining Substance, 
ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 577 (1997) (discussing the historical tie between class action and civil rights en-
forcement).  
 124 See infra notes 127–172 and accompanying text. 
 125 See infra notes 173–194 and accompanying text. 
 126 See infra notes 195–220 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Importance of Class Action in Racial Discrimination Cases 
The Civil Rights Act allows aggrieved parties to bring forth private caus-
es of action for discrimination in areas such as employment, housing, and pub-
lic accommodation.127 Due to the difficulty of proving a racial discrimination 
case and the scope of available remedies, class action has played a vital role in 
privately enforcing civil rights.128 
Subsection 1 discusses the importance of class action in civil rights cases for 
practical and financial reasons.129 Subsection 2 discusses the importance of class-
wide rewards.130 Subsection 3 discusses the deterrent theory of class action.131 
1. Difficulty in Identifying and Proving Racial Discrimination Claims 
Renders Class Action Necessary 
While the Civil Rights Act is impressive in scope, proving that an indi-
vidual has been discriminated under the statute is no easy task.132 First, identi-
fying discrimination is difficult because the discrimination may be covert.133 
Second, plaintiffs must meet the high legal standards imposed by courts.134 
Class action is therefore an essential way in which individuals are able to en-
force civil rights guaranteed to them by the statute.135 
The preliminary task of identifying discrimination is arduous.136 Unlike 
other legal causes of action, discrimination is often latent and thus difficult to 
                                                                                                                           
 127 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3, 2000e-5, 3601-19; Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty Affairs v. Inclu-
sive Cmty Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2518–19 (2015) (bringing a private cause of action against 
discriminatory housing practices); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971) (bringing a 
private cause of action against discriminatory employment practices); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 
300 (1969) (bringing a private cause of action under Title II of the Civil Rights Act). 
 128 See Daniel, 395 U.S. at 300, 307–08 (holding that a public swimming club’s refusal to accept 
African-Americans violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act); Newman v. Piggie Park Enter. Inc., 390 
U.S. 400, 400–01 (1967) (affirming the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decision 
that a restaurant’s refusal to serve African-Americans violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act); 
NAACP Brief, supra note 66, at 5–6 (stating that class actions have been an important way to address 
discrimination); Katherine Lamm, Work in Progress: Civil Rights Class Actions After Walmart v. 
Dukes, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 153, 157 (2015) (explaining class actions’ importance in enforcing 
civil rights). Most notably, the Supreme Court’s iconic decision to outlaw segregation in public 
schools stemmed from a class action lawsuit. See Brown, 347 U.S at 483. 
 129 See infra notes 132–151 and accompanying text. 
 130 See infra notes 152–160 and accompanying text. 
 131 See infra notes 161–172 and accompanying text. 
 132 See infra notes 136–151 and accompanying text. 
 133 See infra notes 136–151 and accompanying text. 
 134 See infra notes 136–151 and accompanying text. 
 135 See infra notes 136–151 and accompanying text. 
 136 Olatunde Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Directives in American 
Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339, 1356–57 (2012) (discussing the difficulties in identifying discrimina-
tion in employment and housing cases); Devah Pager & Bruce Western, Identifying Discrimination at 
Work: The Use of Field Experiments, 68 J. SOC. ISSUES 221, 222 (2012) (highlighting the difficulty of 
identifying discrimination due to sociological reasons). 
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pinpoint.137 Consequently, determining whether one’s rejection from a job or 
from affordable housing was due to discrimination, rather than a benign rea-
son, is difficult to prove.138 Class action, however, alleviates the burden of in-
dividually identifying discrimination by allowing a plaintiff to show that dis-
crimination has occurred on a large scale.139 An employer or landlord has little 
defense when hundreds of minority applicants are rejected rather than one.140 
Class action is also essential when attempting to meet the courts’ onerous 
legal standards.141 For example, with Fair Housing Act claims, plaintiffs are 
often trying to prove a disparate treatment; that is, that the policies of an ad-
verse party have resulted in a disproportionately adverse effect on minori-
ties.142 In the realm of Title VII employment claims, plaintiffs are often 
demonstrating a pattern or practice of discrimination.143 These legal standards 
may require showing the experiences of hundreds or thousands of people.144 
                                                                                                                           
 137 See AM. PSYCHOLOGY ASS’N, DUAL PATHWAYS TO A BETTER AM. 14 (2012) (discussing how 
discrimination may be the result of unconscious prejudices); Devah Pager & Hana Shepard, The Soci-
ology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Mar-
kets, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 181, 200 (2008). The formation of prejudices may be subconscious, making 
it difficult to identify. AM. PSYCHOLOG. ASS’N, supra at 14; Pager & Shepard, supra at 200. Further, 
it is easy to mask discriminatory actions as something else. See Pager & Shepard, supra at 200. For 
example, an employer could argue that an applicant was not rejected for his race, but rather another 
reason, such as grades, personality, or skill set. See id. 
 138 See AM. PSYCHOLOGY ASS’N, supra note 137, at 14 (discussing the prevalence of hidden 
prejudices); Johnson, supra note 136, at 1356–57 (stating that housing discrimination is difficult to 
identify); Pager & Shepard, supra note 137, at 200 (highlighting racial stereotyping made by employ-
ers). 
 139 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427–28 (demonstrating a race based employment class action where 
the court discussed hiring practices on a macro level); Johnson, supra note 136, at 1356–57.  
 140 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427–28 (discussing the hiring practices of a company in a class action 
lawsuit); Johnson, supra note 136, at 1356–57. 
 141 See Inclusive Cmty Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2525 (requiring a showing of disparate impact); 
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336, 339–40 (1977) (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 
14,270 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (stating that finding a pattern or practice requires show-
ing that an occurrence is not an isolated act); Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 19 (stating that, 
without an intensive discovery process, which is more likely in a class action case than an individual 
case, a plaintiff will have a difficult time proving a pattern or practice). 
 142 Inclusive Cmty Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2525. In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the dis-
parate impact test under the Fair Housing Act, but with limitations. Id. at 2523, 2525. The Court ex-
plained that, although proof of intentional discrimination was not needed to meet such a burden, a 
plaintiff must show more than a racial imbalance. Id. at 2523. Although proving a racial imbalance is 
less burdensome than showing intentional discrimination, proving such a burden individually is still 
more onerous than through a class action. See id. 
 143 See Christine Tsang, Comment, Uncovering Systemic Discrimination: Allowing Individual 
Challenges to a “Pattern or Practice,” 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 319, 320 (2013) (stating that plain-
tiffs seeking relief under Title VII often argue a pattern or practice of discrimination). A pattern or 
practice of discrimination, also known as systemic disparate treatment, is discrimination that “repeat-
ed, routine, or of a generalized practice” rather than an isolated incident. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n. 
16 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 14,270).  
 144 See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339–40 n.20 (finding that racial statistics are often necessary to 
reveal latent discrimination); Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 866–67 n.6 (7th Cir. 1985) 
2017] Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy 1375 
Because civil rights cases often attempt to evidence discrimination on a 
macro scale, an individual will have more difficulty meeting such standards 
than a class.145 Class action is thus an essential avenue of redress for practical 
and financial reasons.146 Practically, it is unlikely that an individual would be 
able to show such large scale discrimination on his or her own.147 Proving such 
discrimination likely requires evidence from a number of people across wide 
strata.148 Further, meeting the legal standards requires enormous resources.149 
The discovery process is burdensome thus leading to hefty legal fees.150 There-
fore, it is unlikely an individual will have sufficient capital to finance a dis-
crimination case.151  
                                                                                                                           
(discussing that pattern or practice cases naturally involve claims of an entire group of people, rather 
than a few individuals); Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 16 (stating that individuals will often not 
realize the discrimination they faced was part of a larger pattern or practice); BARBARA LINDERMAN 
SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1322 n.95 (2d ed. 1983) (discuss-
ing that pattern or practice lawsuits require the claims of a class of people). 
 145 See Babrocky, 773 F.2d at 866–67 n.6 (explaining that pattern or practices naturally involves a 
group of people); Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 19 (stating that “without broad discovery of 
company-wide statistical and other data that class action facilitate, it is difficult for civil rights plain-
tiffs to prove a pervasive pattern and practice of discrimination”). The practical reasons for pattern or 
practice discrimination are aggravated by the fact that there is no consensus whether an individual 
claimant can utilize the pattern or practice method of proof. See Tsang, supra note 143, at 126 (dis-
cussing the law regarding non-class private individuals bringing forth pattern and practice suits). 
Compare Celestine v. Petroleos de Venez. SA, 266 F.3d 343, 356 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding the district 
court did not err by not applying the Teamsters framework to a non-class case), Lowery v. Circuit 
City Stores, 158 F.3d 742, 760–61 (4th Cir. 1998) (vacated on other grounds 527 U.S. 1031) (finding 
that non-class plaintiffs are not entitled to pattern and practice framework), and Gilty v. Vill. Of Oak 
Park, 919 F.2d 1247, 1252 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding pattern and practice framework unavailable to non-
class plaintiffs), with Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding that an individual 
claimant can establish a prima facie case evidencing a pattern or practice of discrimination in certain 
circumstances) and Karp v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 199, 213 (D. Mass. 2012) 
(same).  
 146 See Babrocky, 773 F.2d at 866–67 (discussing that pattern or practice cases naturally involve 
claims of an entire group of people, rather than a few individuals); Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, 
at 19 (explaining that a large number of documents is needed to uncover systemic discrimination); 
Sharon M. Dietrich & Noah Zatz, A Practical Legal Services Approach to Addressing Racial Discrim-
ination in Employment, J. POVERTY L. & POL., May–June 2012, at 3 (stating that racial discrimination 
cases are time-consuming and expensive). 
 147 See Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 19 (discussing that discovery costs make it difficult 
for an individual plaintiff to uncover systemic discrimination); SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 144, 
at 1322. 
 148 See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339–40 n.20 (finding that racial statistics are often necessary to 
reveal hidden discrimination); Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 19; SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra 
note 144, at 1322. 
 149 See Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 19; Dietrich & Zatz, supra note 146, at 39 (stating 
that racial discrimination cases are expensive). 
 150 See Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 19; Dietrich & Zatz, supra note 146, at 39 (discussing 
how racial discrimination claims are expensive). 
 151 See Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 19; Dietrich & Zatz, supra note 146, at 39. 
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2. Limiting Plaintiffs, Limiting Rewards 
Successful class action lawsuits have led to resolutions that redress sys-
temic racial discrimination.152 For example, courts have mandated injunctions 
ordering company-wide reform.153 Additionally, class action cases are often the 
impetus for companies to alter practices, as businesses want to limit future lia-
bility and curb negative press.154 In fact, such lawsuits have engendered work-
place reform at numerous Fortune 500 companies such as Coca-Cola, FedEx, 
and Xerox.155 
Requiring a party to individually arbitrate has implications for the type 
and scope of redress that a court will mandate.156 The systemic relief detailed 
above is often not a consequence of individual litigation.157 Courts have ex-
plained that class remedies are improper in the absence of class claims, and 
further a company may not feel the same sense of urgency to reform workplace 
policies.158 Obtaining class-wide relief is therefore an essential way to effec-
                                                                                                                           
 152 See Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 20–21; Tristan Green, Targeting Workplace Context: 
Title VII as a Tool for Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 673 (2003) (explaining that 
class actions are often widely publicized, creating pressure for organizational reform); Sherman, supra 
note 86, at 590 (explaining how class actions have led to institutional reform). 
 153 See Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (granting injunc-
tive relief that mandated numerous workplace reforms); Greenberg, supra note 123, at 577 (noting the 
ties between class action and institutional reform in prisons, schools, and employment) Sherman, 
supra note 86, at 590 (highlighting the connection between class actions and institutional reform). For 
example, a class action against Coca-Cola resulted in injunctive relief mandating workplace change. 
Abdallah, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 1370–71. The court ordered Coca-Cola to adopt an annual diversity 
training, ensure that the career advancement program included a diverse pool of candidates, and hire 
an industrial psychologist to study the company’s human resource practices. Id. 
 154 See Green, supra, note 152, at 673; (explaining that class actions are often widely publicized, 
creating pressure for organizational reform); Sherman, supra note 86, at 590 (finding a connection 
between class actions and institutional reform). 
 155 See Warren v. Xerox Corp., No. 1:01-cv-2909, 2008 WL 4371367, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 19, 
2008) (approving a settlement offer that included $12 million dollars for the creation of a task force to 
ensure diversity at the company); Satchell v. FedEx Corp., No. 3:030-cv-02659, 2007 WL 2343904, at 
*1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2007) (discussing a $15 million dollar class action settlement); Abdallah , 133 
F. Supp. 2d at 1370 (granting injunctive relief that mandated numerous workplace reforms, such as 
annual diversity trainings); Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 8–9; Fortune 500, FORTUNE, http://
beta.fortune.com/fortune500/ [https://perma.cc/BF26-BL9F] (listing Coca-Cola, FedEx, and Xerox as 
Fortune 500 companies). 
 156 See Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 20 (explaining that class actions can lead to wide- 
scale relief); Green, supra, note 152, at 673 (explaining that class actions are often widely publicized, 
creating pressure for organizational reform). 
 157 See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (stating there is a connection between 
relief and the “extent of the violation established”); Lowery, 158 F.3d at 766–67 (finding that non-
class plaintiffs were limited to individualized injunctive relief rather than a class-wide remedy); 
Green, supra, note 152, at 678 (stating that courts are often unwilling to grant class-wide relief to 
remedy individual discrimination decisions). 
 158 See Yamasaki, 442 U.S. at 702 (stating that the extent of the violation controls the scope of the 
injunctive relief); Sharpe v. Cureton, 319 F.3d 259, 273 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[Although] district courts 
are not categorically prohibited from granting injunctive relief benefiting an entire class in an individ-
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tively address entrenched discriminatory practices.159 Consequently, inhibiting 
class action, and thus the scale of relief, undermines an important tool used to 
redress systemic racial discrimination issues.160 
3. The Policy Goal of Deterrence 
In addition to the purposes listed above, class action serves a number of 
policy goals regarding the public good and racial discrimination.161 The most 
important of these goals is the deterrence theory.162 
The deterrent theory posits that companies are disincentivized from ille-
gal conduct when class action is a possibility due to the high cost of such law-
suits.163 In other words, companies are more motivated to ensure lawful prac-
tices rather than remain exposed to a class action lawsuit that could potentially 
result in a multi-million dollar lawsuit and negative publicity.164 
                                                                                                                           
ual suit, such board relief is rarely justified . . . .”); Brown v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 361 
(1st Cir. 1989) (stating that class-wide relief is ordinarily not appropriate where there is only an indi-
vidual claimant); Green, supra, note 152, at 673 (discussing that companies face pressure to reform 
after a class action). 
 159 See Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 8–9 (discussing how class actions have led to work-
place reform); Green, supra, note 152 at 679 (stating that class action is an important way to create 
institutional change). 
 160 See Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 8–9 (explaining how class actions have led to organi-
zational change in the workplace); Green, supra, note 152 at 679 (stating that class action is an im-
portant way to create institutional change). 
 161 See Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 748 F.3d 154, 175 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Hughes v. Kore of Indi-
ana Enterprise, Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2013)) (stating that aggregating claims deters compa-
nies from wrongdoing); Harry Kalven Jr. & Maurice Rosenfeld, The Contemporary Function of Class 
Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686, 688 (1941) (providing a base theory for deterrence). 
 162 See Patrick Luff, Bad Bargains: The Mistake of Allowing Cost-Benefit Analyses in Class Ac-
tion Certification Decisions, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 65, 75 (2010) (explaining that class action acts as a 
deterrent on many levels); Nimmer, supra note 31, at 209 (stating that class action is important for 
deterrence from civil rights infringement); Sternlight, Will the Class Action Survive?, supra note 98, at 
80 (finding deterrence an important class action policy). 
 163 Kalvan & Rosenfield, supra note 161, at 686, 688 (detailing the deterrent theory); Luff, supra 
note 162, at 75–76; Sternlight, Will the Class Action Survive?, supra note 98, at 80. The deterrent 
theory was formally announced in 1948 by Harry Kalven Jr. & Maurice Rosenfeld. Supra note 161, at 
686. 
 164 See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830, 32,862–63 (May 24, 2016) (to be codified 
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040) (finding that companies are more likely to comply with the law if class action is 
an available course of action); Green, supra note 152, at 673 (highlighting the negative publicity that 
accompanies class action lawsuits). For example, when a company knows its employees could ban 
together to form a class action lawsuit, it may be extra cautious to make sure any racial discrimination 
complaints are dealt with swiftly. See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32, 862–63; Green, 
supra note 152 at 673. This could include introducing safeguards and reporting methods to assure that 
any problems are addressed early on, as such internal methods could prevent a costly future class 
action lawsuit. See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,862–63; Green, supra note 152 at 673. 
Thus, the threat of class action keeps companies on their toes and provides a financial incentive to 
follow the law. See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,862–63 (discussing that class actions 
acts as an incentive to comply with the law). 
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When claims are aggregated, plaintiffs’ attorneys have more resources to 
investigate the potential wrongdoing, likely enhancing the quality of such 
claims.165 The higher the quality of claims, combined with the higher stakes of 
the case, means that the opposing party has a considerable amount to lose.166 
Thus the availability of class action to plaintiffs is a large legal liability for de-
fendants, who are often corporations.167  
Conversely, the absence of class action hampers, if not eliminates, such an 
incentive.168 Companies do not have the same sense of urgency to comply with 
the law, since individual lawsuits and arbitrations often do not pose the same 
financial threat.169 For example, when class action is a possibility, a company 
may take steps to implement an internal discrimination reporting system, as this 
may be financially preferable to defending a class action lawsuit.170 Without 
class action, however, the implementation of the same system may seem like an 
administrative burden in comparison to individual lawsuits or arbitrations.171 In 
sum, class action serves the policy goal of deterring illegal behavior, thus serving 
an important public good in regards to racial discrimination.172 
B. Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements Hinder Racial 
Discrimination Claims 
The arguments discussed above—that class action waivers are on the rise in 
the sharing economy, and class action is essential to civil rights claims—
dovetail, and lead to the conclusion that class action waivers in the sharing econ-
omy present a two-fold threat to racial discrimination claims.173 First, class ac-
tion waivers in arbitration agreements prevent emerging theories of sharing 
economy liability from developing due to the procedural differences in arbitra-
                                                                                                                           
 165 See Brandon Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 
613–14 (2012) (stating that aggregating claims allows for a higher quality of adjudication); Luff, su-
pra note 162, at 76 (finding that aggregating claims increases the claims’ quality). 
 166 See Garrett, supra note 165, at 613–14 (stating that aggregating claims allows for a higher 
quality of adjudication); Luff, supra note 162, at 76 (finding that aggregating claims increases the 
claims’ quality). 
 167 See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,862–63 (finding that companies are more 
likely to comply with the law if class action is an available course of action). 
 168 See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,862–63; Kalvan & Rosenfield, supra note 
161, at 686 (finding that when people have to enforce rights individually, rather than in a class, there 
is little deterrence); Luff, supra note 162, at 76 (discussing the various ways class action creates deter-
rence). 
 169 See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,862–63; Kalvan & Rosenfield, supra note 
161, at 686; Luff, supra note 162, at 76 (explaining that class action creates a deterrence effect). 
 170 See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,862–63; Luff, supra note 162, at 76. 
 171 See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,862–63; Luff, supra note 162, at 76.  
 172 See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,862–63 (discussing that the presence of class 
action incentivizes companies to follow the law); supra notes 162–172 and accompanying text.  
 173 See supra notes 113–172 and accompanying text; infra notes 177–195 and accompanying text. 
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tion.174 Second, even if the law is reformed so that sharing economy companies 
can be found liable under the Civil Rights Act or another law, class action waiv-
ers prevent discriminated parties from obtaining proper redress.175 
1. Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements Barricade Court Doors 
Legal scholars and lawyers are crafting creative ways to solve the sharing 
economy’s liability dilemma.176 For example, Gregory Selden’s team argued that 
Airbnb should be a Title II Public Accommodation and should have to comply 
with the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.177 While these argu-
ments are innovative, the barrier presented by class action waivers must be sim-
ultaneously addressed.178 
Most notably, individual arbitration hinders civil rights enforcement due to 
the absence of binding precedent and the “repeat player affect.”179 First, individ-
uals fighting for systemic change are disadvantaged because arbitrators rarely 
base their decisions in precedent.180 Thus, if a panel of arbiters concluded that 
                                                                                                                           
 174 See infra notes 177–186 and accompanying text. 
 175 See infra notes 187–194 and accompanying text. 
 176 See infra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 177 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 11–15. Title II of the Civil Rights Act states 
that no public accommodation shall discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin. See 
42 U.S.C. § 2000a. Per the statute, public accommodations include inns, hotels, motels, or any “other 
establishment which provides lodging to transient guests.” Id. § 2000a(b). Although Airbnb is techni-
cally not a hotel, there is an emerging argument that it should be considered so under the statute be-
cause it is replacing the hotel industry. See id.; Belzer & Leong, supra note 16, at 1296–99. In that 
case, the entire company would be liable. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b); Belzer & Leong, supra note 16, 
at 1296–99. There is also the argument that Title II should apply to the individual Airbnb user. See 42 
U.S.C. § 2000a(b); Belzer & Leong, supra note 16, at 1296–99. Although Title II contains a carve-out 
for establishments with less than five rooms for rent, many Airbnb users rent out numerous locations. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b); Belzer & Leong, supra note 16, at 1296–99. In that case, Airbnb could be 
found liable if the individuals are agents of Airbnb. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 
(AM. LAW. INST. 2006) (discussing the liability of principals); Belzer & Leong, supra note 16, at 
1296–99, 1311 (discussing how Airbnb could be vicariously liable for the acts of its hosts). There is 
also an argument that the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) should apply to Airbnb. Belzer & Leong, supra 
note 16, at 1304–06. Todisco, supra note 51, at 126–27 (2015). The FHA prohibits discrimination in 
the buying or renting of dwellings, as well as in advertising. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012). Although there 
is an exemption for single-family homes, the exemption does not apply when the owner uses a real 
estate broker. See id. § 3603. Airbnb, which closely resembles a real estate broker, could potentially 
defeat the exemption. See id. § 3604; Singleton v. Gendason, 545 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(finding that a company who organized a list of available housing from landlords and then sold the list 
to people who were searching for housing was in the “business of rental dwellings” and thus liable 
under the FHA); Belzer & Leong, supra note 16, at 1304–06; see also Agnieszka A. McPeak, 49 
CONN. L. REV. 171, 215–17 (2016) (discussing tort law in the sharing economy using vicarious liabil-
ity and enterprise liability). 
 178 See infra notes 179–186 and accompanying text. 
 179 See infra notes 180–186 and accompanying text. 
 180 Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, FORD-
HAM L. REV. 761, 785 (2002) (explaining that a decision by arbiters does not create precedent for 
future arbiters or judges); Weidemaier, supra note 78, at 95–96 (finding that arbiters have more flexi-
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Airbnb is a public accommodation, the decision would not have a lasting impact; 
in subsequent arbitration, the panel would not be bound by another panel’s deci-
sion.181 Because decisions only bind the parties in the arbitration agreement, it 
would be very difficult to build a novel legal theory for future proceedings.182 
Furthermore, although arbiters chosen by companies are purportedly neutral, 
there is evidence of a “repeat player” effect.183 As explained, the “repeat player 
effect” is the phenomenon that parties who are more likely to return to arbitration 
will fare better in the present proceeding.184 A company like Airbnb is a repeat 
player because it is likely to be arbitrating claims with multiple consumers.185 
Thus, a company like Airbnb has a considerable advantage in halting innovative 
case law at the expense of individuals bringing racial discrimination claims.186 
2. Class Action Waivers Hinder Development of Claims 
Even if new regulations are promulgated to find Airbnb and other sharing 
economy companies liable for discrimination in the course of their services, 
class action waivers in arbitration agreements threaten the potency of such 
claims.187 As detailed above, class action is vital to systemic change in the realm 
of racial equality.188 The procedure continues to be important for a number of 
reasons, such as the large amount of resources needed to argue a racial discrimi-
nation case, the class-wide relief that accompanies group claims, and the deter-
rence effect.189 By precluding claimants from joining together in racial discrimi-
nation claims, companies like Airbnb not only shield themselves from a large 
                                                                                                                           
bility than judges when coming to a solution). Arbiters will at times cite past arbitration decisions and 
this has led to the argument that maybe there is precedent in arbitration. Knapp, supra at 785. Alt-
hough arbiters are free to cite a past decision, they still are not bound to follow precedent in the way 
that a court is bound. See id. Thus, there is no precedent in the proper sense. See id. 
 181 See Knapp, supra note 180, at 785 (discussing the lack of precedent in arbitration). 
 182 See id.; Weidemaier, supra note 78, at 95–96 (discussing arbitrator’s flexibility vis-à-vis that 
of a judge). 
 183 See Bingham, supra note 80, at 220 (discussing the repeat player effect in the employment 
context); Drahozal & Zynontz, supra note 80, at 857–58 (stating that the repeat player effect is promi-
nent); THE ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP, supra note 80, at 24–25 (discussing the existence of the 
repeat player effect). 
 184 See Bingham, supra note 80, at 220; Drahozal & Zynontz, supra note 80, at 857–58; THE 
ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP, supra note 80, at 24–25. 
 185 See Bingham, supra note 80, at 220. 
 186 See id. Drahozal & Zynontz, supra note 80, at 857–58; THE ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP, 
supra note 80, at 24–25. 
 187 See infra notes 188–194 and accompanying text. 
 188 See Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 2 (noting that class action waivers undermine civil 
rights enforcement); Greenberg, supra note 123, at 577; supra notes 132–172 and accompanying text. 
 189 See Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 19 (discussing the ample discovery process that ac-
companies civil rights cases); Luff, supra note 162, at 76 (discussing class action’s connection to 
deterring illegal conduct); supra notes 132–172 and accompanying text. 
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amount of liability, but also hinder systemic change needed in the sharing econ-
omy.190 
Gregory Selden’s team formulated a novel civil rights argument, but the re-
sources of class action are needed to thoroughly investigate the claim and meet 
the onerous legal standards that the courts impose.191 For example, the third 
count of his complaint, which alleged a violation of the Fair Housing Act, likely 
required showing a disparate impact.192 As discussed, meeting this burden is 
difficult to do individually for practical and financial reasons.193 Further, even if 
Selden was successful in proving his case, his rewards would be unsatisfying: it 
is unlikely a court would grant the wide-scale relief he is truly fighting for.194  
C. Responding to Theories of Self-Regulation and  
Government Enforcement 
Despite these concerns, there are arguments that the class action waiver is 
not as worrisome as scholars claim.195 This section will first address the argu-
ment that the self-regulation of sharing economy companies is enough to combat 
racial discrimination and will then explore the argument that government en-
forcement is sufficient to litigate racial discrimination claims.196 
1. Self-Regulation Is Not Enough 
In the wake of the negative publicity regarding racial discrimination on its 
site, Airbnb did not eliminate its class action waiver.197 Rather, the company re-
sponded by enacting a number of reforms meant to quell discrimination by its 
                                                                                                                           
 190 See infra notes 191–194 and accompanying text. 
 191 See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty Affairs v. Inclusive Cmty Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 
(2015) (requiring that a claimant prove more than a racial imbalance); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Unit-
ed States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 14270 (statement of Sen. Humphrey)) 
(explaining the pattern or practice standard); Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 19 (explaining that 
the resources of a class action are needed for a thorough discovery in a racial discrimination case). 
 192 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at, at 13–14; see Inclusive Cmty. Project, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2523 (holding that disparate impact requires showing less than intent, but more than a racial 
imbalance). It has not been clearly decided in the Supreme Court or lower courts whether a plaintiff 
could demonstrate disparate impact, rather than systemic disparate treatment in a Title II public ac-
commodation case. See Hardie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 97 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1165 (2015) 
(stating that there is a dearth of case law discussing disparate impact under Title II). 
 193 See Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 2; supra notes 132–151 and accompanying text. 
 194 See Yamasaki, 442 U.S. at 702 (stating that the extent of the violation controls the scope of the 
injunctive relief); Cureton, 319 F.3d at 273; Trs. of Bos. Univ., 891 F.2d at 361 (stating that class-
wide relief is ordinarily not appropriate where there is only an individual claimant). 
 195 See infra notes 197–220 and accompanying text. 
 196 See infra notes 197–220 and accompanying text. 
 197 See Airbnb Terms, supra note 12 (demonstrating a class action waiver); Ben Edelman, Re-
sponse to Airbnb’s Report on Discrimination, (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.benedelman.org/news/
091916-1.html [https://perma.cc/33AY-5FU5] (Sept. 19, 2016) (explaining that Airbnb’s report in 
response to discrimination was silent regarding the matter of class action waivers). 
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users.198 For example, Airbnb drafted a “community commitment” statement 
mandating that everyone treat each other equally.199 The company also intro-
duced Instant Book, which allows certain listings to be booked without the ap-
proval of the host.200 In other words, the company regulated itself to solve dis-
crimination issues on its site.201 
One argument raised by business advocates is that the most effective way to 
protect consumer interests, such as inhibiting discrimination, is the type of self-
regulation exemplified by Airbnb.202 These scholars explain that self-regulation 
allows for flexible solutions and permits the companies to remain competitive.203 
Although self-regulation should be applauded and is an important factor in re-
ducing discrimination, it cannot be the sole answer to fighting racial prejudice in 
the sharing economy.204 Self-regulation may allow companies to enact creative 
                                                                                                                           
 198 LAURA MURPHY, AIRBNB’S WORK TO FIGHT DISCRIMINATION AND BUILD INCLUSION 10–12 
(2016), http://blog.airbnb.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/REPORT_Airbnbs-Work-to-Fight-
Discrimination-and-Build-Inclusion.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9BS-RWDN] (detailing the reforms 
Airbnb introduced in light of the discrimination claims); The Airbnb Community Commitment, 
AIRBNB, http://blog.airbnb.com/the-airbnb-community-commitment/ [https://perma.cc/9AAJ-AVH7]. 
Airbnb hired Laura Murphy, former head of the American Civil Liberties Union, to lead an effort to 
minimize discrimination on its site. See MURPHY, supra at 3 (stating that she was asked to write the 
Airbnb report on discrimination). 
 199 The Airbnb Community Commitment, supra note 198. Specifically, the Airbnb Community 
Commitment states, “I agree to treat everyone in the Airbnb community—regardless of their race, 
religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, or age—with 
respect, and without judgment or bias.” Id. 
 200 MURPHY, supra note 198 at 10; What Is Instant Book?, supra note 44. A host, however, is the 
actor who initiates Instant Book on a listing. What Is Instant Book?, supra note 44. Thus, Instant 
Book’s praise is overstated, as hosts are not required to turn it on for a listing and can still discrimi-
nate. See MURPHY, supra note 198, at 22 (applauding Instant Book as reducing bias); What Is Instant 
Book?, supra note 45 (explaining how Instant Book is applied). 
 201 See MURPHY, supra note 198, at 10–12 (discussing the changes Airbnb planned it initiate); see 
also Jodi Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS L. J. 633, 666–68 (2012) 
(defining self regulation as actions taken by private firms to monitor their own activities). In addition 
to initiatives set by companies, self-regulation can also include regulation by the citizen-beneficiaries 
of companies. Short, supra at 668 (discussing different definitions of self-regulation). 
 202 See Harvey Pitt & Karl Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second 
Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L. J. 1559, 1561 (1990) (stating that self-regulation is 
preferable to government regulation which is a disruption to corporations); Varun Sundararajan, Why 
the Government Doesn’t Need to Regulate the Sharing Economy, WIRED (Oct. 22, 2012, 1:45PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2012/10/from-airbnb-to-coursera-why-the-government-shouldnt-regulate-the-
sharing-economy/ [https://perma.cc/7JQL-TDQ6] (identifying reputation and monitoring systems as a 
sufficient substitute for centralized regulation); Susan Taplinger, The Plain Facts: Why Self-
Regulations Works Better Than Government Regulations, DATA & MARKETING ASS’N (May 9, 2014), 
https://thedma.org/blog/advocacy/the-plain-facts-why-self-regulation-works-better-than-government-
regulation/ [https://perma.cc/U9VL-5XVC] (explaining that self-regulation promotes innovation and 
is in the best interest of markets and consumers). 
 203 See Pitt & Groskaifmanis, supra note 202, at 1561; Sundararajan, supra note 202; Taplinger, 
supra note 202.  
 204 See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-REGULATION TO CO-
REGULATION 145–47 (2010) (explaining that self-regulation requires oversight). 
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and flexible solutions; however, there are a number of disadvantages that prove 
outside enforcement is necessary.205 For example, self-regulation often leads to 
under enforcement.206 Further, self-regulation ebbs and flows with certain fac-
tors, such as global competition and societal wishes.207 Thus, as the sharing 
economy grows and more companies become involved, it cannot be assumed 
that all companies will implement organizational changes when necessary.208 
In sum, while self-regulation is an important piece of the puzzle, it needs to 
be coupled with outside enforcement.209 In the case of Airbnb, its self-
implemented changes are not sufficient to stop racial discrimination.210 In the 
sharing economy more generally, self-regulation cannot be counted on as it may 
not be in every company’s best interest.211 The outside check of a class-action 
claim remains necessary to enforce civil rights.212 
2. Government Enforcement Is Insufficient 
In addition to the calls for self-regulation, it has also been argued that that 
private enforcement of civil rights claims is unnecessary due to existing gov-
ernment enforcement.213 The basis of this argument is that government offices 
and agencies, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, can 
equally substitute private class actions.214 Thus, companies will still be deterred 
from wrongdoing even in the absence of private class actions.215  
                                                                                                                           
 205 See id. at 146–47 (explaining that public enforcement and private litigation is necessary to 
enforce workplace rights). 
 206 See id. at 158 (discussing that under enforcement is a serious problem in self-regulatory 
schemes). 
 207 See Bryant Cannon & Hanna Chunt, A Framework for Designing Co-Regulation Models Well-
Adapted to Technology-Facilitated Sharing Economies, 31 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L. J. 23, 39–40 
(2014) (finding that sharing economy companies may lack incentives to protect consumers); Kimberly 
D. Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127, 148–49 (2009) (explaining that enforced 
self-regulation may lead to dangerous results for regulated groups and interest groups affected by such 
regulations). 
 208 See Cannon & Chunt, supra note 207 at 39–40; Krawiec, supra note 207 at 248. 
 209 See ESTLUND, supra note 204, at 145–47 (discussing the existence of an enforcement gap in 
self-regulatory schemes in the employment realm); Cannon & Chunt, supra note 207 at 39–40 (find-
ing that sharing economy companies do not always have an incentives to protect consumers). 
 210 See Cannon & Chunt, supra note 207 at 39–40 (finding that sharing economy companies may 
lack incentives to protect consumers); Krawiec, supra note 208, at 248–49 (discussing that self-
regulated entities may ultimately act in their own interet); What Is Instant Book?, supra note 44 
(demonstrating that the host is the actor who initiates instant book). 
 211 See Cannon & Chunt, supra note 207 at 39–40; Krawiec, supra note 207 at 248–49. 
 212 See Cannon & Chunt, supra note 207 at 39–40. 
 213 See Discover Bank v. Superior Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1122 (Cal. 2005) (using the government’s 
power to enforce rights as a reason for why class action waivers should not be found unconscionable). 
 214 Id. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which was founded in the wake 
of the Civil Rights era, has jurisdiction to enforce Title VII racial discrimination claims. See 3 U.S.C. 
§ 454 (2012) (stating that the EEOC shall have jurisdiction over Title VII claims). Further, under Title II, 
the Department of Justice often brings forth cases of racial discrimination in public accommodations. 42 
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This argument flounders because the government does not have the re-
sources to be the sole disciplinarian of civil rights compliance.216 While gov-
ernment prosecution of civil rights is a vital aspect of enforcement, it can only 
prosecute a small percentage of the racial discrimination complaints that they are 
faced with.217 For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
litigates less than one percent of the charges filed each year.218 Similarly, the 
Department of Justice prosecutes an extremely small percentage of employment 
discrimination cases filed with their office.219 Thus, the government is not an 
effective substitute for private class action lawsuits.220 
IV. LOOKING FORWARD: WAYS TO LIMIT THE CLASS ACTION WAIVER 
While it is important that scholars and lawyers continue to build sharing 
economy liability theories, class action waivers must be dethroned if racial 
discrimination claims are to triumph against sharing economy companies.221 
Recent Supreme Court decisions upholding class action waivers demonstrate 
                                                                                                                           
U.S.C. § 2000a-6(a) (stating that the Attorney General shall have power to enforce Title II when they 
believe an actor has engaged in a pattern or practice od discrimination). There are a number of other 
government agencies that have power the to litigate civil rights claims. THE LACK OF ACCESS TO 
COURTS AND EFFECTIVE REMEDIES TO ENFORCE CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA, NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO RESTORE CIVIL RIGHTS 19 (2007) [hereinafter LACK OF 
ACCESS]. For example, the Department of Transportation, Department of Health and Human Services, 
and Environmental Protection Agency have respective Offices of Civil Rights. Id. 
 215 See Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1122 (stating that the federal and states’ authority to enforce 
rights as a reason for why class action waivers should not be found unconscionable). 
 216 See EEOC v. Waffle House Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 290 n.7 (1997); Brief for NAACP, supra note 
66, at 21–23 (discussing the shortfall of resources the government faces when enforcing civil rights); 
LACK OF ACCESS, supra note 214, at 15–19 (explaining that governments entities have not been effec-
tive in enforcing civil rights due to a lack of resources). The Supreme Court in Waffle House conceded 
that certain government agencies, such as the EEOC, are not able to effectively enforce employment 
discrimination cases. See 534 U.S. at 290 n.7 (citing EEOC statistics that in 2000, the commission 
received 79,896 complaints but only filed 291 lawsuits). 
 217 Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 21–23; LACK OF ACCESS, supra note 214, at 15–19. 
 218 See Waffle House Inc., 534 U.S. at 290 n. 7 (stating that the EEOC filed 291 lawsuits, even 
though it received 79, 896 charges of employment discrimination); Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, 
at 21–23 (noting that government cannot sufficiently enforce civil rights on its own). 
 219 Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 22. In addition to the EEOC and the Department of Jus-
tice, many other government agencies lack the proper resources. See LACK OF ACCESS, supra note 
214, at 15–19. For example, the Office of Civil Rights for the Department of Transportation, the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Health and Human Services have notable short-
comings in enforcing civil rights. See id. These problems include a growing complaint backlog, inabil-
ity to collect sufficient data, and staffing shortfalls. See id.; Brietta R. Clark, Hospital Flight from 
Minority Communities: How Our Existing Civil Rights Framework Fosters Racial Inequality in 
Healthcare, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1023, 1058 (2006) (discussing the shortcomings of gov-
ernment enforcement in Title VI healthcare discrimination claims). 
 220 See Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 21–23; LACK OF ACCESS, supra note 214, at 15–19 
(discussing the shortfall of resources the government faces when enforcing civil rights). 
 221 See Lard, supra note 31; see also Belzer & Leong, supra note 16, at 1296–99, 1304–06 (dis-
cussing ways to find Airbnb liable under current law). 
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that the solution may not start with the courts.222 Rather, other bodies of gov-
ernment need to work together to limit the waiver in the civil rights context.223 
Section A explains that Congress should amend or create a law with a “contra-
ry congressional command” to the FAA.224 Section B examines how an agency 
could promulgate regulations prohibiting binding arbitration and class action 
waivers in certain types of contracts.225  
A. Enacting a Law With a “Contrary Congressional Command” 
While the Supreme Court has held that the FAA preempts state law and 
overrides many federal laws, there is opportunity for Congress to enact legisla-
tion that would counter the broad statute.226 Specifically, Congress could and 
should pass or amend a civil rights law evidencing a clear congressional com-
mand against arbitration or class action waivers.227  
If a federal statute is to override the FAA, it must raise a contrary con-
gressional command against arbitration.228 In order to prove that a statute con-
tains such authority, the party opposing arbitration must show intent from the 
statute’s text, history, or purposes.229 Currently, courts state that there is no 
contrary congressional command in civil rights enforcement cases.230  
                                                                                                                           
 222 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 105, at 187 (discussing the difficulties in finding solutions to the 
class action waiver dilemma); see also Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2034, 2309 
(2013) (holding that an arbitration clause is enforceable despite the fact the cost of arbitration is higher 
than the amount an individual would recover); AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 
(2011) (finding that California common law banning class action waivers was preempted by the 
FAA); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010) (finding that class 
arbitration cannot be imposed on parties unless there is a contractual basis). 
 223 See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2309; Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344; Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 
684.  
 224 See infra notes 226–235 and accompanying text. 
 225 See infra notes 236–246 and accompanying text. 
 226 See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344 (finding that the FAA preempts California law); Fitzpatrick, 
supra note 105, at 188 (detailing how a federal law could override the FAA). 
 227 See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2309 (discussing contrary congressional command); Jean 
Sternlight, Compelling Arbitration of Claims Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866: What Congress 
Could Not Have Intended, 47 KAN. L. REV. 273, 323 (1999) (discussing how arbitrating claims is 
inconsistent with the Civil Rights Act of 1866) [hereinafter Sternlight, Intended]. 
 228 See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2309 (stating that no contrary congressional command was 
found to override the FAA); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98 (2012) (explaining 
that a contrary congressional command is needed to override the FAA). For example, in Italian Col-
ors, the Supreme Court found that no such “contrary command” existed to override the FAA. 133 S. 
Ct. at 2309. Respondents argued that arbitrating claims individually would run contrary to antitrust 
laws because doing so was financially impractical. Id. The court, however, found that there was no 
guarantee in antitrust law that there be an affordable path to litigation. See id. Further, the Court ex-
plained that there was no reference to class action in the Sherman Antitrust Act and Clayton Act Id. 
 229 See Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1998) (explaining how to provide 
contrary congressional intent). For example, in McMahon, Respondent argued that § 29(a) of § 27 of 
the Exchange Act evidenced such intent, as §29 voids the waiver of “any provision” under the Ex-
change Act. 428 U.S. at 228. The Supreme Court did not agree, finding that the “any provision” lan-
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Due to the strong tie between civil rights and class action, however, such 
a command could exist if a civil rights law were enacted referencing collective 
action, or if the Civil Rights Act were amended to include an anti-arbitration 
provision.231 The statute would need to be narrowly tailored to the civil rights 
context, but encompass sharing economy companies: the broader the statute, 
the less likely the courts are to find the necessary contrary command needed to 
override the purpose of the FAA.232 One example of a contrary congressional 
command is the 2015 amendment proposal to the Serviceman Civil Relief Act 
(“SCRA”) limiting arbitration.233 In a bipartisan effort, Senator Lindsey Gra-
ham and Senator Jack Reed hoped to limit arbitration agreements by giving 
service members the opportunity to opt out of such clauses in connection with 
the SCRA.234 While the SCRA was not ultimately amended, the proposal’s 
explicit language against arbitration provides an example of congressional in-
tent that would evidence a contrary congressional command to arbitration.235 
                                                                                                                           
guage did not extend to statutory duties, but rather only substantive obligations under the Act. Id. 
Thus, no intent existed. Id. 
 230 See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
Title VII claims can be subjected to arbitration). 
 231 See Brief for NAACP, supra note 66, at 2; Sternlight, Intended, supra note 227, at 323 (de-
scribing how compelling claims to arbitration is inconsistent with the purpose of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866). Further, no “contrary congressional command” has been found in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 discrim-
ination claims either. See Kidd v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 32 F.3d 516, 520 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(upholding a district court decision that a 42 U.S.C § 1981 claim can be arbitrated); Sternlight, Intend-
ed, supra note 227, at 276–78 (discussing the courts’ allowance of 42 U.S.C § 1981 claims to enter 
arbitration). 
 232 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 105, at 185 (explaining how certain scholars believed the Califor-
nia common law was invalidated because it was too broad); Jerrett Yan, Note, A Lunatic’s Guide to 
Suing for $30: Class Action Arbitration, the Federal Arbitration Act and Unconscionability After 
AT&T v. Concepcion, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 551, 559 (2011) (arguing that the California 
law’s breadth was the main reason it was preempted by the Supreme Court). 
 233 See H.R. 4161, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015) (detailing Congressional text that evidences a 
command against arbitration). 
 234 See id.; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, Bipartisan Bill Would Protect Service 
Members’ Rights to Avoid Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/11/21/business/dealbook/bipartisan-bill-would-protect-service-members-right-to-go-to-court.
html [https://perma.cc/SFR8-24SE]. Specifically, the bill was to “require the consent of parties to 
contracts for the use of arbitration . . . and to preserve the rights of servicemens to bring class actions 
under such act.” H.R. 4161. The SCRA allows active duty service members to terminate real estate 
and auto leases when deployed, and requires that lenders reduce interest rates on loans by 6%. 50 
U.S.C. §§ 3901–4043; Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra. The financial institutions, however, often 
violate the statute. Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra. When service members sue for redress, they 
are often compelled to arbitrate because of the mandatory arbitration agreements in the institutions’ 
contracts. Id. The proposed amendment was a response to the outcry against mandatory arbitration in 
this context. Id. 
 235 See CompuCredit Corp., 565 U.S. at 98, 100–01 (discussing contrary congressional com-
mand); H.R. 4161 (114th): SCRA Rights Protection Act of 2015, GOVTRACK https://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/114/hr4161 [https://perma.cc/S9V2-UG3X]. 
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B. Agency Regulations to Limit the Class Action Waiver 
In addition to Congress enacting or amending a law with a contrary con-
gressional command, a federal agency could promulgate regulations prohibit-
ing binding arbitration and class action waivers in civil rights cases.236 There 
have been attempts to ban the class action waiver or binding arbitration in a 
few contexts.237 In November 2016, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
(“CMS”) implemented regulations prohibiting binding arbitration in Long-
Term Care (“LTC”) facilities.238 In May 2016, the Consumer Finance Protec-
tion Bureau (“CFPB”) proposed regulations banning binding, individual arbi-
tration in certain consumer contracts.239 These regulations have not been suc-
cessfully implemented: the CMS proposed to amend its regulation after the 
Supreme Court upheld a LTC facility arbitration agreement.240 The CFPB filed 
its new rule on July 10, 2017, but the regulation’s fate remains uncertain as 
many lawmakers have vowed to repeal.241 Despite the ambivalence of out-
                                                                                                                           
 236 See 42 C.F.R. § 483.70(n)(1) (2016) (prohibiting pre-dispute binding arbitration in long-term 
care facilities); Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,830–31 (May 24, 2016) (to be codified at 
12 C.F.R. pt. 1040). 
 237 See 42 C.F.R. § 483.70(n)(1); Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,831–32 (proposing 
regulations that would ban arbitration agreements in certain consumer contracts). 
 238 See 42 C.F.R. § 483.70(n)(1); Fisher Phillips, Nursing Home Arbitration Agreements: A 
Changing Landscape, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=
2d06aa6b-2862-45d9-8bed-032b08118f40 [https://perma.cc/BME5-L2RK]. The regulation, in rele-
vant part, states: “[a] facility must not enter into a pre-dispute agreement for binding arbitration with 
any resident or resident’s representative nor require that a resident sign an arbitration agreement as a 
condition of admission to the Long Term Care (“LTC”) facility.” 42 C.F.R. § 483.70(n)(1). 
 239 See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,831–32. In particular, the rule would ban bind-
ing arbitration in consumer agreements for checking and savings accounts, credit cards, student loans, 
and other types of consumer loans. Id. 
 240 See Proposed Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. 26,649, 26,651 (June 8, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 
483); see also Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1428 (2017) (holding that the 
Kentucky Supreme Court’s clear-statement rule, which was used to invalidate an arbitration agreement, 
is preempted by the FAA). The Center for Medicare and Medicaid stopped enforcing the initial regula-
tion after a district court judge halted the regulation with an injunction. See 42 C.F.R. § 483.70(n)(1) 
(prohibiting pre-dispute binding arbitration in nursing home agreements); Am. Health Care Ass’n v. 
Burwell, 217 F.Supp.3d 921, 946 (N.D. Miss. 2016); Letter from Director, Survey and Certification 
Group, to State Survey Agency Directors (Dec. 9, 2016) https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-
Enrollment-and-Certification/SurveyCertificationGenInfo/Downloads/Survey-and-Cert-Letter-17-
12.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4W9-NKSF] (stating that the agency will not enforce the arbitration regula-
tion in light of the court injunction). After the Supreme Court upheld binding arbitration in Kindred 
Nursing Centers, the agency stepped back from the original regulation and proposed revisions. See 
Proposed Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. at 26,651. If enacted, the revised regulations would not prohibit binding 
arbitration. See id. Rather, the regulations would require LTC facilities to be transparent about arbitra-
tion. See id. Specifically, “the agreement must be explained to the resident. . . in a form and manner 
that he or she understands” and “the resident acknowledges that he or she understands the agreement.” 
Id.  
 241 See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,831–32; Ramona L. Lampley, The CFPB Pro-
posed Arbitration Ban, the Rule, the Data, and Some Considerations for Change, AM. BAR ASS’N: BUS. 
L. TODAY, https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2017/05/07_lampley.html [https://perma.cc/
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comes, agency action is powerful first step towards limiting binding arbitration 
and class action waivers.242 
In regards to Airbnb and racial discrimination, the United States Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) could be the proper agen-
cy to propose such regulations if the company’s actions were to fall under Fair 
Housing Act.243 Since its inception in 1965, HUD has been an important force 
in enforcing fair housing laws and combatting discrimination.244 Just as the 
CFPB is designated to protect consumers, HUD’s role is to protect equal and 
fair housing.245 HUD regulations could look similar to those proposed by the 
CMS or the CFPB, and prohibit class action waivers in contracts concerning 
the buying, renting, or advertising of a dwelling.246 
CONCLUSION 
The sharing economy continues to grow in numerous sectors, and is be-
coming increasingly pervasive in the consumer’s daily life. Despite sharing 
economy’s progressive messages and novel technologies, racial discrimination 
is still a pressing issue. Current laws and regulations do not go far enough to 
redress these types of claims due to the novel structure of sharing economy 
companies, and class action waivers present in consumer contracts. While ef-
forts to adapt regulations and introduce novel legal theory should be applaud-
ed, the conversation must simultaneously address class action waivers.  
Due to the necessary contractual relationship in the sharing economy, 
class action waivers are popular and prominent in sharing economy company 
contracts. These waivers are especially detrimental to racial discrimination 
claims because of the inherent tie between civil rights and class action. Thus, 
                                                                                                                           
6RN2-BL8K] (speculating why the CFPB has not published the proposed rule). The House of Represent-
atives voted to repeal the rule on July 25, 2017, using the Congressional Review Act. See 5 U.S.C.§ 801 
(2016); Yuka Hayashi, House Votes to Repeal CFPB’s Arbitration Rule, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2017, 
5:24pm) https://www.wsj.com/articles/house-votes-to-repeal-cfpbs-arbitration-rule-1501017889 
[https://perma.cc/SMN5-AW7T]. The repeal now moves to the Senate, where fifty-one votes will be 
needed to finalize the repeal. See Hayashi, supra. 
 242 See 42 C.F.R. § 483.70(n)(1); Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,831–32. 
 243 See 42 U.S.C. § 3531 (2016) (discussing the purpose of establishing the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development (“HUD”)); Mission, HOUSING & URBAN DEV., https://portal.hud.gov/
hudportal/HUD?src=/about/mission [https://perma.cc/CU66-9PAK] (stating that the mission of HUD 
is to eliminate housing discrimination). In regards to employment, the EEOC would likely be a proper 
agency to promulgate regulations regarding class action waivers and employment. See 3 U.S.C. § 454. 
The EEOC is charged with enforcing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. See id. 
 244 See 42 U.S.C. § 3531 (discussing the purpose of establishing HUD); Mission, supra note 243.  
 245 See 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (delegating to CFPB the power to create regulations restricting arbitra-
tion agreements in certain instances); 42 U.S.C. § 3531 (stating the purpose of HUD). 
 246 See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,830–31 (discussing the proposed CFPB regu-
lations); Mission, supra note 243 (discussing HUD’s mission).  
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change must be initiated to limit class action waiver, so that statutes such as the 
Civil Rights Act can continue to protect the rights of all. 
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